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Abstract. As documented in the first installment of this essay (Hofmann 2020b), through-
out the first half of the twentieth century, theological conformity to monogenism, the 
alleged descent of all human beings from Adam and Eve, was closely linked to Catholic 
doctrines of original sin. Receptivity to polygenism, the more scientifically supported 
account of human origins through a transitional population, was further discouraged by 
Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical Humani generis. Nevertheless, de facto acceptance of polygen-
ism became commonplace following Vatican II. A significant turning point was reached 
when an effort to have polygenism designated “contrary to Catholic faith” failed to 
persuade the Council Fathers and the topic was not included in Dei Verbum, the 1965 
Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. In 1968, the presentation of polygenism 
as a viable theological option in The Supplement to A New Catechism was clear evidence 
that opposition to polygenism within the Roman Curia had abated. Furthermore, a pre-
ponderance of post-Vatican II theological discourse on original sin either marginalized 
monogenism or retained it in a spiritual rather than a biological sense. The historical 
record shows that theological commitment to monogenism has been more deeply 
rooted in doctrines of Catholic tradition than was the case for geostasis. Secondly, 
again in contrast to geostasis, monogenism has been amenable to nuanced conceptual 
development, including purely spiritual characterizations. These two historical factors 
provide some explanation for the longstanding Catholic commitment to monogenism. 
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To the extent that dogmatic convictions premised upon traditional doctrines of original 
sin continue to be perceived as both compelling and authoritative, it can be expected 
that some form of theological monogenism will also persist.1 
Keywords: Dei Verbum, Humani generis, Karl Rahner, monogenism, Paul VI, pre-Adamites.
1. Initial Reactions to Humani generis
The twelve-year period between the publication of Humani generis and the 
beginning of Vatican II was a time of complex scientific and theological 
dialectic (Kapusta 2009). It included the discovery of the molecular structure 
of DNA and the initial applications of protein sequencing and molecular 
clocks to the study of human evolution, developments that of course could 
not be foreseen when Humani generis was issued on August 12 of 1950. 
Although the encyclical did not single out any specific proponent of nouvelle 
théologie, it did admonish anyone who would deny the primacy of Thomistic 
metaphysics as the best vehicle to explicate permanent theological truth. 
But it also expressed a guarded receptivity to the science of human origins.
Thus, the Teaching of the Church leaves the doctrine of Evolution an open 
question, as long as it confines its speculations to the development, from other 
living matter already in existence, of the human body. (That souls are immediately 
created by God, is a view which the Catholic faith imposes on us.) In the present 
state of scientific and theological opinion, this question may be legitimately 
canvassed by research, and by discussion by experts on both sides (Knox 1950, 190).
On the other hand, after a passing reference to those who are “misrepre-
senting the whole nature of original sin,” Pius XII explicitly ruled out two 
versions of polygenism. His brief comments were slightly enigmatic and 
translations of the original Latin to some extent reflected the expectations or 
prior convictions of the translators. What the pope actually wrote was that, 
in contrast to the freedom granted to Catholic scholars for research on the 
general topic of human evolution, and with respect to polygenism in partic-
1 Earlier drafts of this essay have been improved due to very helpful comments from Ken-
neth Kemp who should not be assumed to agree with my analyses or conclusions.
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ular, “cum nequaquam appareat quomodo huiusmodi sententia componi queat 
cum iis quae fontes revelatae veritatis et acta Magisterii Ecclesiae proponunt 
de peccato originali” (Pius XII 1950). Gustave Weigel credited Ronald Knox 
with one of the most accurate English translations of the encyclical (Weigel 
1951, 544); Knox rendered the crucial phrase cum nequaquam appareat by 
the English “it does not appear.”
There are other conjectures, about polygenism (as it is called), which leave 
the faithful no such freedom of choice. Christians cannot lend their support 
to a theory which involves the existence, after Adam’s time, of some earthly 
race of men, truly so called, who were not descended ultimately from him, or 
else supposes that Adam was the name given to some group of our primordial 
ancestors. It does not appear how such a view can be reconciled with the 
doctrine of original sin, as this is guaranteed to us by Scripture and tradition, 
and proposed to us by the Church. Original sin is the result of a sin committed, 
in actual historical fact, by an individual man named Adam, and it is a quality 
native to all of us, only because it has been handed down by descent from him 
(Knox 1950, 190).
The Vatican website presently uses a similar translation that “it is in no way 
apparent” how polygenism is to be reconciled with the doctrine of original 
sin. In either version, the encyclical’s wording does seem to hold open the 
possibility that the appearance of incompatibility might be overcome in the 
future. It also should be noted that Humani generis warned that polygenism 
appeared to be irreconcilable with fontes revelatae veritatis et acta Magisterii 
Ecclesiae; Knox translated this tandem as “Scripture and tradition,” and the 
relative import of each factor would be subject to scrutiny by both biblical 
scholars and theologians during the subsequent two decades.
Two general categories of polygenism were suspect. One scenario 
would involve humans who exist “after Adam’s time” but are not descended 
from him. This would be the case, for example, if humans originated inde-
pendently in more than one time and place. This was how polygenism had 
been defined by Georges Vandebroek, and it would also apply to Hermann 
Klaatsch’s earlier racial polygenesis (Hofmann 2020b, 108 and 133). These 
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cases would more accurately be termed polyphyletic polygenism or human 
polyphyletism.2 There are other possibilities that might be included in this 
first category of polygenism depending upon how humanity is characterized, 
either physically or spiritually. For example, if members of a unique human 
population contemporary to Adam left human offspring not descended from 
him and living “after Adam’s time,” this would be a form of monophyletic 
polygenism included in Pius XII’s first category. During the 1950s and 
1960s, hypotheses involving “pre-Adamite” or “co-Adamite” populations 
were carefully formulated with due concern about this form of polygenism. 
Humani generis also precluded a second general category of polygenism 
in which, using Knox’s translation, “Adam was the name given to some 
group of our primordial ancestors.” This imprecise wording implies the 
more common twentieth century form of monophyletic polygenism where 
“Adam” would refer to the entire initial human population rather than an 
individual. Reliance upon transitional populations was of course central to 
the population genetics approach to species change developed by Theodosius 
Dobzhansky during the 1930s (Dobzhansky 1937). For example, analysis of 
a single transitional population as the source of Homo sapiens would pertain 
to the simplest version of what came to be known as the “out of Africa” 
hypothesis. Although he did not elaborate any detailed examples, Pius 
XII presumably held that all forms of both polyphyletic and monophyletic 
polygenism were in apparent conflict with traditional understanding of the 
origin and transmission of original sin from a unique initial pair of human 
individuals responsible for the first sin.
Interpretations of the encyclical’s succinct wording ranged over quite 
a broad spectrum. Anthony Cotter took it to have a very restrictive import; 
he translated the encyclical’s precautionary sentence on polygenism as 
“For it is unintelligible how such an opinion can be squared with what the 
sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Magisterium of the 
Church teach on original sin, which proceeds from sin actually committed 
2 The non-racial hypothesis that during the 1980s became known as multi-regionalism also 
posits multiple sources for the evolution of modern humans but additionally allows for 
significant complications such as migration and gene flow.
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by an individual Adam, and which, passed on to all by way of generation, is 
in everyone as his own” (Cotter 1951, 43). Cotter had previously published 
objections to virtually all aspects of evolutionary theory (Hofmann 2020a, 
261), and he maintained this perspective in his commentary with a blunt 
condemnation of polygenism. 
Neither theory can be reconciled with what the Magisterium has always taught on 
original sin. While the Encyclical is not a new definition on this point, a Catholic 
would be rash to ignore it. Some die-hards might wish to see a loophole in the 
words “for it is unintelligible” (cum nequaquam appareat) as if they left the door 
open for a different decision in the future. This would be an illusion. Polygenism 
is definitely banned; it should not even be put forward as a hypothesis. Mono-
genism is the Catholic doctrine, though the Encyclical does not settle the further 
question what precise theological note it is to be assigned (Cotter 1951, 105).
Cotter’s uncompromising assessment was seconded by Charles Boyer, 
theology professor at the Pontifical Gregorium University in Rome.
Under the name of Adam, one cannot understand a collectivity, but only an 
individual. The reason for these affirmations is to be found in the fundamental 
doctrine of original sin, as found in scripture and fixed by the Councils. A single 
man sinned and his sin has been transmitted by generation to all men. There 
is no way to accommodate polygenism. A Christian is not free to sustain it 
even as a hypothesis. It would certainly be to betray the thought of the Holy 
Father to see in the formula “cum nequaquam appareat” a door left half-open 
for a different directive in the future. Polygenism, as defined in the encyclical, 
is definitely precluded (Boyer 1950, 533).
Although Cotter and Boyer were free to publish their interpretations, 
Teilhard de Chardin was not allowed that privilege. His writing had been 
subject to Jesuit censorship since the 1930s and for the rest of his life he was 
consistently barred from non-scientific publication by either his Superior 
General or the Holy Office. Shortly after the publication of Humani generis, 
he wrote a short note, only published posthumously, in which he maintained 
the position he had held since 1910, namely that the application of mono-
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genism and polygenism terminology should be to designate the initial human 
population as one couple or multiple couples. The pope had also referred 
to a second mode of polygenism, which Teilhard noted was more accurately 
called polyphyletism, the descent of humanity through multiple lineages. 
More substantively, he also pointed out that because science cannot with 
absolute certainty decide between monogenism and polygenism, they “are in 
reality purely theological notions, introduced for dogmatic reasons” (Teilhard 
de Chardin 1971, 209). Nevertheless, concerning monogenism, a scientist 
“may judge that this hypothesis is rendered scientifically untenable by all 
we believe we know so far of the biological laws of ‘speciation’ (or ‘genesis 
of species’)” (Teilhard de Chardin 1971, 210). Here Teilhard had in mind the 
speciation process from the perspective of population genetics, the gradual 
change in gene frequencies due to mutation and natural selection. He could 
only hope that “theologians will somehow come to realize that, in a universe 
as organically structured as that of which we are now becoming conscious, 
a solidarity of man, much closer even than that which they seek in ‘the 
bosom of Mother Eve’, is readily provided for them by the extraordinary 
internal cohesion of a world which, all around us, is in a state of cosmo- and 
anthro-genesis” (Teilhard de Chardin 1971, 211). 
It would take about fifteen years for Teilhard’s evolutionary conception 
of human unity to become commonplace in discussions of original sin. In the 
meantime, a frequently adopted alternative to the uncompromising position 
of Cotter and Boyer was a tentative acceptance of monogenism subject to 
reconsideration based upon possible theological progress. For example, along 
with the prominent Jesuit biblical scholar Jean Levie, Ernest Messenger was 
one of those who, in the view of Cotter and Boyer, illegitimately saw “a door 
left half-open” for a future reassessment of polygenism. Messenger repeated 
Levie’s observation that “the Pope has carefully given the reason why the 
polygenism in question is to be rejected: he says, not that ‘it is altogether 
clear that such a theory cannot be reconciled with’ the doctrine of original 
sin, but ‘it is in no wise clear how such a doctrine can be reconciled with’, 
etc.” (Messenger 1951, 214; Levie 1950, 789). Although Messenger died on 
December 25 of 1951, his last comments on polygenism were published 
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posthumously and he again expressed his views cautiously. On the one hand, 
“…Humani generis does not constitute a final and irreformable decision, or 
a dogmatic definition on the point in question by the Holy See, and it is 
for the theologian to examine more closely the nature of the unique sin of 
Adam and the mystery of its transmission to his descendants” (Messenger 
1953, 163). Here Messenger again implied that, if polygenism should prove 
to be true, theological adjustments may have to be made in the traditional 
understanding of original sin and its transmission. However, he was not 
willing to simply consign the issue to scientific inquiry. “Science, on the 
other hand, does not finally settle the question one way or the other, and 
a Catholic scholar should experience no very great difficulty in accepting 
the monogenist hypothesis suggested to him by considerations arising 
from a different branch of knowledge, i.e. Christian theology” (Messenger 
1953, 163). A similar but slightly more conservative position was taken 
by Marie-Michel Labourdette. He agreed that monogenism could not be 
theologically assessed in isolation from the defined doctrine of original 
sin, which of course was why polygenism was ruled out in Humani generis. 
Scientific assertions of polygenism are not only fallible but pertain only to 
physical phenomena rather than the spiritual domain of salvation history 
in which monogenism has been revealed. On this point, “our faith is more 
affirmative than our science” (Labourdette 1953, 165).
In 1951 the American Jesuit Gustave Weigel wrote a bibliographic survey 
article in which he summarized the first eighteen months of the published 
literature on the encyclical. Unfortunately, he conflated the two categories 
of polygenism cited in Humani generis in his introductory definition.
As to the meaning of the word “polygenism” in the encyclical there was unani-
mous agreement: the origin of the human race that we know on this our earth, 
not from a single couple but from an indefinite number of original pairs, unre-
lated among themselves and directly produced by evolution (Weigel 1951, 544).
In spite of his less than ideal starting point, Weigel did accurately ob-
serve that polygenism was not the primary concern of most of the early 
commentators; much more attention was given to nouvelle théologie and 
9(1)/202170
J A M E S R. H O F M A N N
the reasons for the Vatican’s disapproval. For example, writing in Études, 
Robert Rouquette emphasized the encyclical’s positive tone concerning 
evolutionary research and added only a brief comment that, “according to the 
polygenic hypothesis, the human race would have appeared simultaneously 
within a multitude of individuals. This is only a hypothesis that, contrary 
to evolutionism, does not arise from a consideration of observable facts. 
Under these conditions, the magisterium considers that this pure hypothesis 
should not be held by the theologian” (Rouquette 1950, 115). As had been 
the case during the modernist crisis a half century earlier, the status of 
Thomism as the metaphysical structure for theology was once again in 
question. Henri de Lubac was frequently singled out by commentators and 
accused of arguing both that theological truths are subject to changes in 
philosophical expression and that theology should adopt the language of 
modern philosophy, especially existentialism (Greenstock 1950).
In those cases where polygenism was discussed at length, attention was 
sometimes given to improving terminology. Guy Picard defined monogenism 
as “the doctrine according to which the modern human species only had its 
origin in a single couple.” Although he then gave a less precise definition 
of polygenism as “the contrary opinion, which affirms several initially 
independent couples” (Picard 1951, 65), he did qualify it by distinguishing 
between polygenism “in the strict sense,” where multiple human couples 
would be the initial descendants of a single ancestral non-human species, 
and polyphyletism, the convergent evolution of distinct human populations 
from several ancestral non-human species.3 As had been argued by many 
others, Picard agreed that comparative anatomy gave no support to polyphy-
letism but did give limited confirmation of polygenism in the strict sense. 
Picard also presented what he called a “probability argument.” Scientific 
analysis yields no expectation that the origin of a new species would include 
a bottleneck of two individuals; there is no empirical reason to expect such 
a small population during the transitional stage. The relevant mutations 
take place by chance and would be equally probable for a large number of 
3 By simply equating polygenism with polyphyletic polygenism, Augustin Bea’s claim that 
scientists had abandoned polygenism was seriously misleading (Bea 1951, 52–54).
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individuals. However, Picard also felt that philosophically there was reason 
to see in the orderly pattern of evolution an imposition of intelligence, God’s 
creation of an “immense work of art.” From this perspective, “the arrival of 
a new species is monogenist or polygenist according to the intention of the 
Author of nature” (Picard 1951, 87). Picard’s conclusion, if not his rather 
trite philosophical argument, was widely shared by theologians in 1951; 
monogenism could and should be accepted because it was not absolutely 
ruled out scientifically and because it is known through “revelation” or, 
more specifically, the revelatae veritatis et acta Magisterii Ecclesiae (revealed 
truth and the documents of the Magisterium of the Church) referred to in 
Humani generis.
The divergence between scientific and theological reactions to the 
encyclical’s prohibition was inadvertently expressed in an article co-authored 
in two independent sections by the Louvain anatomist Georges Vandebroek 
and the Jesuit theologian Léon Renwart (Vandebroek and Renwart 1951). 
The two parts of the article were not tightly synthesized and the result-
ing discordance reflected a widening gap between science and orthodox 
theology. For this publication, Vandebroek revised his earlier 1950 essay 
and did not include his definitional comments. Recall that Vandebroek’s 
formulation of polygenesis was not that all humans are descended from 
one ancestral population, but rather that “the various human races derive 
from parallel lines that separated from a common stock before attaining 
the human level” (Vandebroek 1953, 140; Hofmann 2020b, 133). Even if one 
of these lineages had Adam as its origin, this form of polygenism would 
assert the existence of other human lineages not descended from Adam. 
This is presumably the primary version of polygenism Pius XII had in mind 
when prohibiting the idea that “there existed on this earth true men who 
did not take their origin through natural generation from him as from the 
first parent of all.” Secondly, Vandebroek’s broad sense of monogenism was 
that “all the hominids derive from a single stock that had already attained 
a human level.” In Renwart’s section of the article, he pointed out that 
Vandebroek’s notion of monogenism was not how the term was used by 
theologians unless Vandebroek’s reference to a “single stock” of human 
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ancestors was restricted to a single couple (Vandebroek and Renwart 1951, 
348). Vandebroek also included a long footnote in which he commented 
that from a scientific perspective the descent of all humans from a single 
couple was “almost inconceivable” (Vandebroek and Renwart 1951, 341). 
The resulting message of this co-authored article was highly ambivalent. As 
a scientist, Vandebroek considered the narrow sense of monogenism to be 
“almost inconceivable,” while Renwart the theologian held it to be precisely 
the one dictated by Pius XII. Renwart’s serenely optimistic recommendation 
was that Catholic scientists should have no reservations about incorporating 
monogenism into their understanding of human origins. Even though the 
genetics of large populations is central to the study of evolutionary change, 
scientific methods cannot detect the defining characteristic of the first 
humans, the human soul, and scientific research cannot unequivocally 
refute the monogenetic hypothesis even if it has no parallel in the origin 
of any other species (Vandebroek and Renwart 1951, 351). In the immediate 
aftermath of Humani generis, Renwart’s conclusion was a typical example 
of the pervading message from theologians not subject to censorship: in 
spite of its scientific shortcomings, monogenism must be accepted due to 
theological doctrines associated with original sin. As Dominique Dubarle 
commented a few years later, adherence to the pope’s directive in Humani 
generis did not rule out hope that future scientific and theological progress 
would alleviate any immediate psychological “tension” (D. Dubarle 1957, 90).
2. Pre-Adamite Hypotheses prior to Vatican II
One set of responses to the challenge of Humani generis relied upon com-
binations of biological polygenism and theological monogenism. That is, 
while sizable populations of individuals biologically equivalent to modern 
humans might have preceded and coexisted with Adam, he could still be 
thought of as the first individual to be both human and capable of sin. There 
were several variations of this idea. In some cases, “pre-Adamites” were 
thought to be only biologically equivalent to humans and Adam was the 
first to be ensouled. For other authors, the predecessors were thought of as 
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ensouled humans who either were not granted the gift of sanctifying grace 
or who had not reached the state of psychological development needed for 
the moral responsibility exercised in the first instance by Adam. In all these 
options, the shared insight was that, by giving Adam a distinct spiritual 
status within the co-Adamite population, theological monogenism might 
be preserved by postulating that lineages unrelated to Adam all go extinct. 
Although pre-Adamite populations are not mentioned in Genesis, 
speculation about them is not prohibited by any Catholic doctrine. In 
a 1911 volume of The Catholic Encyclopedia, Anthony Maas warned that 
conflict with doctrines of original sin and the unity of the human race 
would be avoided as long as no fully human descendants of hypothetical 
pre-Adamite forebears were thought to survive into the time of Adam 
and thereafter. In his 1935 article on pre-Adamites for the Dictionnaire de 
théologie catholique, Émile Amann was less assertive and considered the 
duration of these descendants’ survival to be a complicated open question 
(Maas 1911; Amann 1935, col 2799).
One of the first reactions to Humani generis that relied upon pre-
Adamites came from Canon Camille Muller, a botanist at the University of 
Louvain, who insisted that he wrote as a Catholic scientist without any claim 
to theological authority. In an earlier 1949 essay, reissued in translation in 
1962, Muller had considered the possibility that human groups might have 
existed “before the one to which Jesus Christ belonged” (Muller 1962, 25). 
He did not identify these populations with any scientific nomenclature 
and he argued that the existence of these people would not necessarily 
contradict the doctrine of the universal scope of the redemptive power of 
Christ. He did so by drawing upon the elevated state of a human soul when 
granted the benefit of sanctifying grace. In general, sanctifying grace acts 
as an infused habitus; a sanctified soul is given a disposition or receptivity 
to the divine will over and beyond natural propensities and is thereby raised 
to the supernatural order.4 Although pre-Adamites were human insofar as 
they were ensouled, Muller speculated that they may not have been called 
4 For an example of contemporary discussion, see Michel 1941.
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to the supernatural order (appelée à l’ordre surnaturel) through the gift of 
sanctifying grace. If not, then they could not fall from this order through 
sin and were not in need of salvation. He noted that their ultimate fate 
would present a theological puzzle but not one as pressing as that posed 
by unbaptized children from our own era (Muller 1962, 26). Muller also 
prudently acknowledged the theoretical possibility of human monogenesis 
for “our group” of humans: “we could strictly speaking just say that its 
origin from one pair is not altogether impossible and that the believer may 
therefore reasonably admit designs of a higher order without attempting 
to determine it scientifically” (Muller 1962, 26).
In his 1951 commentary on Humani generis, Muller interpreted the 
encyclical as an encouragement for scientists to pose new theological 
questions based upon the modern understanding of human evolution. He 
repeated a long passage from his 1949 essay and again considered possible 
“human groups” existing prior to the “definitive humanity” that began with 
Adam. He acknowledged that it is a matter of faith that Christ died for all 
of sinful humanity, a single genealogy descended from the initial sinner. 
He then cited Robert De Sinéty’s 1928 article on “Transformisme” to point 
out that at Trent the Council Fathers could not have foreseen the scientific 
investigation of ancient life; they necessarily thought of human unity within 
the restricted scope of modern humans (De Sinéty 1928). Muller considered 
it plausible that God bestowed sanctifying grace upon a single couple within 
a larger population of co-Adamites and he then offered for consideration 
a hypothetical “less strict” form of monogenism.
Through the successive unions of the descendants of several primitive couples 
(including the initial couple of Genesis), a very limited number of generations 
would be enough for all men to be descended from the first man of which 
Genesis speaks (without requiring marriages between brothers and sisters), and, 
just as likely perhaps, for all modern humanity (the only ones the Fathers of 
the councils would have considered) to be tainted by original sin and saved by 
Christ. Would not this still be monogenism, less strict, but equally efficacious? 
(Muller 1951a, 304).
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Under this scenario, interbreeding between the direct descendants of 
Adam and Eve would take place with their human contemporaries. After an 
indefinite period of time, all lineages stemming from “primitive couples” 
that did not include this interbreeding could be presumed to die out. After 
that point, all humans would be able to trace their ancestry back to Adam 
and Eve and would have inherited the results of original sin. This state of 
affairs would have been reached well before the time when the Council 
Fathers at Trent proclaimed that all humans are descended from Adam. 
Because the genealogical descendants of Adam would include all living 
humans “after a limited number of generations,” Muller’s hypothesis could 
be considered a “less strict” form of theological monogenism. However, 
there would be a period of time during which some human lineages existed 
that were not descended from Adam and this would appear to violate the 
prohibition in Humani generis against that category of polygenism.5 Muller’s 
succinct expression of theological monogenism was not widely discussed by 
theologians; most were more inclined to reassess the doctrine of original sin 
than to try to make monogenism compatible with evolutionary biology. For 
example, André-Marie Dubarle took note of Muller’s expansive interpretation 
of Humani generis but did not mention his efforts to preserve monogenism 
(A.-M. Dubarle 1964, 228).
Muller also was quite assertive in complaining that Pius XII had under-
stated the status of evolution among scientists; he admitted that arguments 
continued about evolutionary lineages and causal mechanisms, but the 
scientific world “is convinced of the fact of evolution” (Muller 1951a, 301). 
Although accurate, this declaration contradicted high-profile statements 
by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, who still insisted upon calling evolution 
an unproven hypothesis (Garrigou-Lagrange 1948, 200). Furthermore, in 
a speech in September of 1953, Pius XII seconded Garrigou-Lagrange’s 
view and added that “if most researchers present the doctrine of descent 
as a ‘fact’, this constitutes a hasty judgment” (Pius XII 1953). This point of 
contention may have been one reason why the pamphlet reprint of Muller’s 
5 Muller did not invoke Adam’s longevity to speculate that he survived past the expiration 
date of these lineages.
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1951 essay was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in December of 1953 
(Muller 1951b).
Andrew Alexander offered a defense of monogenism that was more 
theologically acceptable than Muller’s but was premised upon an improbable 
genetic hypothesis (Alexander 1964). He speculated that the final stage in 
the transition from the non-human to the human physical body transpired 
through a single genetic mutation in one individual out of a larger popula-
tion, a scenario that René Lavocat would pointedly reject as scientifically 
unrealistic several years later (Lavocat 1967b). Alexander imagined that 
one novel gene made Adam suitable for ensoulment and hominization and 
that this crucial gene could then be passed on to offspring who would in 
turn become human upon introduction of souls. Ensoulment would also 
be granted to the offspring of interbreeding between direct descendants 
of Adam and non-human co-Adamites; all humans would necessarily be 
genealogically descended from Adam while purely non-human lineages 
went extinct. Alexander managed to preserve theological monogenism but 
only at the cost of a scientifically improbable genetic hypothesis.
Another brief discussion of pre-Adamites published in the immediate 
aftermath of Humani generis was provided by Charles Journet, a long-
standing professor of dogmatic theology at the diocesan major seminary 
in Fribourg. His extensive contributions to apologetics were informed by 
his relatively conservative Thomism and his concern for papal authority. 
In his 1951 Petit Catéchisme sur les Origines du Monde, Journet used a ques-
tion-and-answer format to explain how monogenetic human origins might 
be integrated into an evolutionary perspective. One possibility was that, 
out of a pre-existing non-human population, one couple was ensouled 
and became the first humans from whom all subsequent humans descend 
(Journet 1951, 41). Another option would involve ensoulment of an entire 
preexisting non-human population prior to the choice of one couple to 
play a role in subsequent spiritual development. “It is from these men that 
God, in order to inaugurate on earth the order of grace, would set aside one 
couple. He would form them in his image and bestow upon them original 
justice. Only the descendants of this group would survive the catastrophes 
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of prehistory” (Journet 1951, 42). By postulating appropriate extinctions 
of all lineages other than that of Adam and Eve, either scenario could be 
scripted to preserve theological monogenism. The Petit Catéchisme was not 
a venue where an extensive discussion was to be expected and Journet did 
not address any of the relevant scientific issues. In response to the question 
of whether polygenism should be rejected as irreconcilable with revelation, 
he simply quoted the relevant section from Human generis and repeated the 
truism that science could not unequivocally prove either monogenism or 
polygenism. Journet later participated in one the pre-conciliar theological 
commissions for Vatican II and was appointed Cardinal by Paul VI in 1965. 
Shortly thereafter he would serve on the commission of Cardinals respon-
sible for an evaluation of the controversial New Catechism, an investigation 
that would result in a Supplement in which polygenism was presented as 
a legitimate possibility.
Giovanni Blandino was relatively unconcerned about the importance of 
monogenism and placed more emphasis on the process of sin’s transmis-
sion. Trained in philosophy, theology, and biology, Blandino was a prolific 
author who taught for many years at the Pontifical Lateran University in 
Rome where he accepted the plausibility of the human body’s evolution 
from non-human ancestors. In a 1962 essay on original sin, he presented 
for theological consideration two “hypotheses” involving a pre-Adamite 
population. Blandino reserved the term “human” to refer only to individ-
uals in which human souls have been introduced and he considered both 
pre-Adamites and co-Adamites to be human in this sense. However, he 
also proposed a time period of indefinite duration during which human 
mental capacity developed to the point at which it became capable of 
understanding revealed truth and moral injunction. Although the Genesis 
text does not distinguish between the initial production of humans and 
a subsequent infusion of sanctifying grace, Blandino argued that the 
conflation of separate events for expository purposes is not uncommon 
in biblical literature. Furthermore, to refer to Adam as “the first man,” as 
is the case in the Trent documents, “may be only a repetition of biblical 
expressions, without any intention to define that the first couple elevated 
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to the supernatural state had no human ancestors” (Blandino 1962, 4). With 
this understanding of human development in mind, Blandino proposed 
his first “hypothesis”.6
Perhaps the human couple that was the first to receive sanctifying grace from 
God, as well as other preternatural gifts, and that committed the original sin and 
from which the entire human race descends, was not the first human couple to 
live on earth, but was engendered by pre-existing humans (Blandino 1962, 1).
Blandino added that, when Adam and Eve failed the test set for them by God, 
they lost the supernatural gifts they had been accorded, both for themselves 
and all their descendants. Although he agreed with the tradition that all 
modern humans are descended from Adam and Eve, it would have taken 
some time for unrelated lineages of co-Adamites to die out. The extent of 
this time period would depend upon whether or not the direct descendants 
of Adam and Eve interbred with co-Adamites and their offspring. The case in 
which this interbreeding did take place was the second of Blandino’s hypo-
thetical scenarios, and the one he preferred. Even though pre-Adamites and 
co-Adamites were human and left some offspring who were not descended 
from Adam and Eve, Blandino calculated that, after approximately ten 
thousand years of interbreeding, all humans would have either maternal 
or paternal ancestry going back to Adam and Eve. “In order to enter the 
world with original sin and to inherit the promise of salvation, it suffices 
to descend from Adam and Eve through a single branch, that is, either the 
paternal line or the maternal line” (Blandino 1962, 2).
Both of Blandino’s two hypothetical scenarios appeared to conform to 
Catholic doctrine insofar as original sin was depicted as a sin by one couple 
transmitted through generation to all humans existing after approximately 
the time of Abraham. However, prior to that point in time, the existence of 
human descendants of co-Adamites not subject to the effects of original 
sin was problematic. As was the case for Muller, because Blandino consid-
ered co-Adamites to be human, both of his hypotheses at least nominally 
6 Blandino noted that Charles Journet had mentioned this idea in his 1951 Petit Catéchisme.
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included polygenism and stood in apparent conflict with the Humani generis 
prohibition. Blandino was never publicly sanctioned; whether he was ever 
delated to the Holy Office might be determined when relevant archival 
records are subject to research.7 
During the 1950s and early 1960s few theologians were willing to make 
a serious commitment to the existence of pre-Adamites. The German Jesuit 
Karl Rahner commented that, even though the idea is not prohibited, “this 
is not to say that a theologian may not hold that Pre-Adamitism is a the-
ory which is scientifically speaking arbitrary, as well as being absurd and 
dangerous theologically” (Rahner 1961, 233). The admission of human pre-
Adamites “would imply a divine decree in which not all spiritual creatures 
were called to the vision of God by grace” (Rahner 1969, 105). Contrary to 
Muller and Blandino, Rahner considered it unacceptable to imagine that, 
prior to original sin, God would withhold sanctifying grace from any indi-
viduals who could legitimately be referred to as human (Rahner 1962, col. 
561; Rahner 1970, 187). Nevertheless, in spite of Jean Levie’s comment that 
pre-Adamite theory had had its “hour of celebrity” (Levie 1950, 789), the idea 
survived and would be discussed more widely after Vatican II. Meanwhile, 
although prior to 1950 German theologians had not published as profusely 
on monogenism as had the French, they now became more engaged with 
the issue. In particular, Karl Rahner gave an influential argument that, 
although monogenism is theologically certain, it does not have a secure 
basis in scripture. His complex argument contributed to concern over how 
original sin doctrine should be included in a broader understanding of the 
relationship of scripture and tradition to revelation, an inquiry that would 
intensify during the Vatican II years.
7 According to Henri-Marie Guindon, Blandino submitted his ideas to a Vatican II theology 
commission in 1962 (Guindon 1979, 107). He also reprinted his 1962 essay in the 1977 
first volume of his three-volume collection of essays, Questioni dibattute di teologia al-
though by this later date he no longer ascribed to his earlier views.
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3. Pre-Conciliar Developments and Vatican II
Two events bracketed the decade between 1954 and 1964, a period of uncer-
tainty in which a significant turning point was reached. In 1954 Karl Rahner 
supplied an argument against polygenism that ratified the Humani generis 
prohibition and affirmed monogenism as theologically certain. Ten years 
later, a chapter of a Vatican II preliminary schema that would have targeted 
polygenism as contradictory to Catholic doctrine was not considered worthy 
of discussion by the council and was not incorporated into Dei Verbum, the 
Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. This decision in effect marked 
the end of concerted effort by anti-polygenists within the Roman Curia to 
mandate the acceptance of monogenism.
When Humani generis was issued in 1950, Karl Rahner was a Professor 
of Dogmatics at the University of Innsbruck. Despite the interruption of 
World War II, he had begun to assert himself as an independent thinker with 
a philosophical penchant for drawing subtle distinctions in the exploration 
of hypothetical premises and their contingent implications. His zeal for 
sustained theological argument and his relentless stamina for lecturing, public 
speaking, editing, and prolific publication would make him one of the most 
influential German theologians during the 1960s. His nuanced analysis of 
monogenism first appeared in 1954 and was reprinted in English translation 
in 1961 (Rahner 1954 and 1961; McMahon 2002a). Although his argument 
that monogenism is theologically certain temporarily supported a conser-
vative reading of Humani generis, Rahner would reverse his position in 1966. 
His initial discussion is an important example of theological reluctance to 
abandon monogenism during the years between Humani generis and Vatican II.
Rahner began by explaining the sense in which he was using the category 
“theologically certain:”
… by theologically certain we mean anything of which on the one hand it cannot 
be said with absolute certainty that it is revealed by God and is indubitably 
taught as such by the Church; and which on the other hand can legitimately 
claim our interior assent, in such a way that a contrary doctrine is not tolerated 
by the Church (Rahner 1961, 234).
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The Humani generis prohibition of polygenesis certainly proclaimed 
that it was not to be tolerated. 
What is said of polygenism formally and substantially characterized in this way 
is that it is not a free opinion in the Church, it cannot be held. Thus it is not 
permitted positively to defend polygenism even as a possible theory or scientific 
hypothesis, the grounds of this inadmissibility being of course theological and 
not derived from natural science. Quite intentionally, a more precise theological 
qualification (for instance, ‘This opinion is heretical’) is not given. Thus the 
only theological qualification of monogenism which may be derived from the 
encyclical just by itself is that it is theologically certain (Rahner 1961, 233).
Rahner’s goal was to provide a detailed explanation of how polygenism 
contradicted doctrine, an argument that Humani generis had not included. 
While avoiding any direct engagement with scientific issues, his discussion 
was three-pronged: exegetical, doctrinal, and more briefly, metaphysical. 
From an exegetical perspective, Rahner was convinced that although the 
author of Genesis asserted the unity of humanity using a monogenetic 
narrative form, this did not mean that monogenism itself was also being 
taught. Furthermore, Saint Paul simply repeated the wording of the Genesis 
source and should not be attributed independent significance on this score. 
Rahner placed more weight on indirect arguments in which the assumption 
of polygenism leads to a contradiction with doctrine that thereby confirms 
monogenism.
The indirect proof of monogenism consists in the demonstration that it is an 
indispensable presupposition of the doctrines of redemption and original sin as 
these are contained in Scriptures and in its interpretation by Tradition and the 
Church’s magisterium; and that in this sense it is taught in Scripture. That this 
proof must be regarded as the most important of all may also be seen from the 
arguments with which ‘Humani Generis’ justifies its rejection of polygenism, 
though with the utmost brevity (Rahner, 1961, 268).
Rahner first considered the most commonly used indirect proof in which the 
assumption of polygenism is said to conflict with the Tridentine doctrine of 
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original sin as a singular historical event with effects transmitted through 
propagatione. Rahner noted that although the term propagatione must be 
contrary to imitatione, it might not have to be restricted to direct physical 
descent. He then offered for consideration a polygenetic hypothesis in which 
direct descent would not be necessary for the initial transmission of sin’s 
effects to all co-Adamites.
The first man created in the state of original justice is nominated by God as the 
trustee, in respect of the justice compulsorily intended by God for all men, for 
all the men who follow him, whether they descend from him physically or not. 
This first man loses original justice for himself and all other men. Thus all are 
subject to original sin. The universality of original sin and its unity of origin 
are preserved. It is through Adam that all are subject to original sin, the other 
first pairs not indeed generatione, but per inoboedientiam primi hominis, non 
imitatione. Soon, one could go on, all these men become so mixed that there 
was no longer a single man left who did not go back to Adam generatione as 
well (Rahner 1961, 270–271).
This polygenetic scenario would conform to the requirement that original 
sin was a unique event with universal effect. To make the indirect argument 
for monogenism compelling would require ruling out this hypothetical coun-
terexample through an additional argument that the correct understanding 
of propagation must be limited to direct physical inheritance. Rahner had 
reservations about that train of thought; in 1966 he would explicitly reject 
it and also drop his objections to polygenism. For the present, he considered 
a second indirect proof to be more promising. He insisted that the doctrine 
of universal salvation requires that Christ be of common human “stock” 
and he cited numerous New Testament references to the incarnation that 
go beyond mere symbolic expression to make this point. 
The emphasis laid upon the identity of origin and on the assumption of a human 
nature precisely as historically incriminated … shows clearly that Christ’s 
brotherhood with us can be neither a mere community of disposition or of grace, 
nor one based purely upon the specifically human nature. Rather, he enters 
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redemptively into our one common history of guilt, which is one because it is 
the history of our physically real common stock (Rahner 1961, 276).
At this stage in Rahner’s thinking, although he suspected that the required 
universal transmission of the effects of original sin might be construed 
in such a way as to allow polygenism, he could not imagine an analogous 
compatibility with his understanding of the incarnation and redemption. 
“All we have said about the situation of salvation and damnation may be 
summed up as follows: Scripture knows of such a common situation of 
salvation and ruin only in so far as men are of one stock” (Rahner 1961, 
279). Furthermore, “A universal situation of damnation is only conceivable, 
supposing it to be based upon the community of a stock, if it is historically 
established at the origin of this community,” that is, with the first two 
individuals of the Genesis narrative (Rahner 1961, 281). Consequently, the 
prohibition of polygenism in Humani generis was appropriate and requires 
adherence to the theological certainty of monogenism “with inner (but not 
in itself irreformable) assent” (Rahner 1961, 234).
Hans Küng, more reliant upon scripture rather than doctrinal tradition 
as a basis for his theology, once gave an apt description of Rahner’s deft 
theological skill that applies to his defense of monogenism: “As a master of 
theological dialectics he transforms his historical no into a dogmatic yes” 
(Küng 2008, 332). Rahner added a more succinct metaphysical argument 
using a principle of parsimony; since it would suffice to initiate humanity 
through a single couple, polygenesis would be superfluous. But in 1954 he 
primarily maintained that monogenism was appropriately ruled theologically 
certain due to an indirect argument that polygenism contradicted doctrines 
of salvation, the reasoning he believed was the best motivation for the 
Humani generis prohibition.
As might be expected, Rahner’s argument was seconded by those who 
agreed with his conclusion. Nevertheless, during 1957 and 1958 several 
theologians also alluded to the disturbing incompatibility between scien-
tific support for polygenism and theological commitment to monogenism. 
Johannes Feiner, a Swiss professor of fundamental theology at the Chur 
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seminary, contributed to a collection of essays originally published in 
1957 and reissued in the United States in 1965. For Feiner, “Monogenism 
is an important instance in the encounter between the Church’s teaching 
and the scientific concept of the world,” a situation in which Feiner alleged 
that “as yet no final certainty has been reached on either side” (Feiner 1965, 
54). Feiner held that polygenism would require “an essential change of the 
Church’s teaching concerning original sin and redemption,” a change he 
was not willing to condone (Feiner 1965, 54–55). He agreed with Rahner 
that scripture alone could not resolve the issue and he also commended 
Rahner’s indirect argument against polygenism, that is, that the universal 
redemptive intercession of Christ is based upon membership in the human 
race, “a true community of flesh and blood ‘from one’” (Feiner 1965, 55). 
Feiner also agreed with Rahner that this understanding of Christ’s lineage is 
a revealed doctrine of the New Testament. “This Christological truth requires 
that the unity of race be understood in a strict sense, as a fact dependent on 
a first man who establishes the totality of the race in its historical origin” 
(Feiner 1965, 55). Consequently, monogenism must be accepted, even if 
contrary to “our modern habits of thinking” (Feiner 1965, 56).
The growing malaise associated with the topic of monogenism during 
the 1950s was clearly articulated by the Dubarle brothers, André-Marie and 
Dominique Dubarle, both French Dominicans. André-Marie published his 
first book on original sin in 1958; during Vatican II he would thoroughly 
revise it for an American edition in which he contributed to the new 
perspectives of the early 1960s (A.-M. Dubarle 1964). In 1957, Dominique 
Dubarle acknowledged that with respect to monogenism, “We therefore find 
ourselves, for the moment, in the presence of a certain tension between the 
more or less spontaneous intellectual tendency among certain believers 
and a determination maintained by theologians, with the sanction of the 
magisterium authority, in a matter of faith” (D. Dubarle 1957, 89). Dubarle 
advised that the “psychological difficulty” of this tension should be accepted 
as part of an active spiritual life; adherence to monogenism as a point of 
faith did not rule out hope that scientific and theological progress would 
eventually clarify the situation. 
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While Dominique Dubarle included in his discussion a conventional 
summary of the Catholic doctrine of the divine introduction of human 
souls, Rahner was at that time proposing a more innovative account of 
hominization. In his Das Problem der Hominisation, Rahner concentrated on 
how the human soul might originate without miraculous divine intervention. 
In his references to “Adam” and the “first man” he seemed to tacitly assume 
monogenism, although he did not make this explicit, and he affirmed that 
the biblical account is silent about how humanity originated, informing us 
only that it received a unique spiritual status. With respect to evolutionary 
theory in general, Rahner wrote that he detected a new consensus forming 
“behind the facade of printed theology” (Rahner 1965, 29). Furthermore, “the 
change of view has taken place more rapidly in the oral teaching of lectures 
(which are much more numerous and livelier than printed textbooks), than 
in printed books, which are few and always voice the views of only a small 
number of theologians” (Rahner 1965, 30). Nevertheless, in his 1962 article 
on monogenism for the Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche, Rahner reaffirmed 
the conservative position that polygenism cannot be scientifically proven 
and that “On theological grounds, monogenism must be maintained in any 
case” (Rahner 1962, col 562). So it certainly was not Rahner’s position on 
polygenism that resulted in the warning he received in 1962 that he would 
need to submit future writing to a preliminary Roman censorship. His views 
on ensoulment, Mariology, and concelebration of the Eucharist were more 
likely to have been in question. Later that year Pope John XXIII appointed 
him peritus for Vatican II and the threat of censorship was lifted in 1963 
(Vorgrimler 1986, 92–93). Rahner’s acceptance of polygenism later in the 
1960s would contribute to the new theological climate of that period.
The death of Teilhard de Chardin on the evening of Easter Sunday in 
1955 was followed by a new phase in the impact of his work. Collections of 
his writings now were systematically published in response to extensive 
interest in his legacy. The Jesuit Edouard Boné was one of a new generation 
of Catholic paleontologists who explicitly drew inspiration from Teilhard’s 
example. In the year of Teilhard’s death, Boné began a prestigious career 
as a paleontologist and theologian at the University of Louvain. He wrote 
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an assessment of the Piltdown fraud shortly after it was revealed (Boné 
1955), and his celebration of Teilhard’s life appeared in the Revue des 
questions scientifiques (Boné 1956). Boné was fulsome in his praise for 
Teilhard’s scientific work and his efforts to achieve a philosophical and 
theological synthesis with Christianity; he did not mention the strained 
relationship Teilhard had endured with his religious superiors. During 
1959 Boné completed a review of the polygenism issue in which he wrote 
from a scientific perspective and did not introduce theological issues 
(Boné 1960). He accurately noted that, while nineteenth century debate 
had concentrated on the question of human races arising from one or 
multiple ancestral human lineages, twentieth century theologians had 
shifted attention to the alleged origin through a single couple. In addition 
to Teilhard, Boné credited Henri Vallois for appropriately using the ter-
minology of monophyletism and polyphyletism to analyze the nineteenth 
century issue of the unity of the human race. Boné retained this usage 
and reserved the distinction between monogenism and polygenism for 
discussion of whether human origins took place within a population or by 
means of a single couple. He then compared two approaches to speciation, 
either rapidly due to a crucial mutation, or more slowly through the gradual 
fixation of multiple mutations subject to natural selection. In neither case 
is monogenism at all scientifically probable. In this respect, Boné cited 
Teilhard and the Bouyssonie brothers approvingly, as well as geneticists 
who were accomplishing the neo-Darwinian synthesis: George Gaylord 
Simpson, Ronald Fisher, Sewall Wright, and J.B.S. Haldane. The scientific 
arguments against monogenism had become far too strong to simply ignore 
or dismiss as uncertain. Boné returned to the issue in 1962, again quoting 
Teilhard extensively and using him and Robert de Sinéty as support for 
the conclusion that monogenesis had no standing from a purely scientific 
perspective (Boné 1962). There was no scientific reason to doubt that hu-
manity had the same type of polygenetic origin as other animal species and 
the best available theory of speciation included a slow process of mutation 
and natural selection, the population genetics of Neo-Darwinism. Boné 
acknowledged that the theory still had its detractors, but it was the best 
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one available and any forthcoming objections to polygenism could only 
be expected from theological quarters.
Conservative theological voices were of course still in evidence. When the 
American Jesuit Cyril Vollert contributed an essay on Genesis and evolution 
to a symposium held at Duquesne in 1959, his reading of Humani generis was 
that it decidedly ruled out polygenism, albeit not because of direct scriptural 
revelation, but because of the doctrine of original sin enshrined in tradition.
Pius XII states that polygenism is incompatible with the dogma of original sin. 
The supposition of a collective Adam is untenable because it is out of joint 
with what the sources of revelation and the acts of the magisterium of the 
Church proclaim about original sin, which stems from a sin truly committed 
by an individual person, Adam. This declaration of the Holy Father decides the 
question and closes discussions, formerly engaged in by some theologians, on 
the reconciliation of the polygenist hypothesis with faith (Vollert 1959, 116).
Jean de Fraine drew more nuanced conclusions similar to those of Rahner. 
Although at Trent the bodily transmission of original sin from Adam was 
not declared doctrine, it certainly was presumed. “If we deny theological 
monogenesis, the transmission of original sin is in danger of being denied 
too. Therefore we consider the denial of the descent of mankind from one 
single couple as at least temerarious” (De Fraine 1962, 74). Nevertheless, 
de Fraine concluded that Pius XII’s stance against polygenism was not 
irrevocable and he expected further theological investigation of the issue.
Meanwhile, on June 30 of 1962, just prior to the opening session of Vat-
ican II, the Congregation of the Holy Office issued a “Monitum” concerning 
Teilhard de Chardin. This admonition asserted that Teilhard’s writings 
“abound in such ambiguities and indeed even serious errors, as to offend 
Catholic doctrine. For this reason, the most eminent and most revered 
Fathers of the Holy Office exhort all Ordinaries as well as the superiors of 
Religious institutes, rectors of seminaries and presidents of universities, 
effectively to protect the minds, particularly of the youth, against the dangers 
presented by the works of Fr. Teilhard de Chardin and of his followers” 
(Congregation of the Holy Office 1962). No specific doctrines or followers 
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were mentioned. Publication of Teilhard’s collected works, including his 
discussions of original sin, continued amid a high demand indicative of 
the disparity between the closed perspective typical of the Roman Curia 
and the more receptive mentality of many working theologians on the eve 
of Vatican II.
Although the council would not result in any new doctrinal definitions, 
this was not a foregone conclusion in 1959 when John XXIII announced his 
intention to convoke it. Only after extensive debate and negotiation would 
the Council Fathers decide to reaffirm general principles for the sources 
of revelation rather than define new doctrines of original sin, for example. 
Trent had of course left a legacy bearing upon both of these topics. In 
addition to its canons on original sin, it had decreed that the truths of the 
gospel are preserved in written books and in unwritten tradition. It was well 
known that this formulation replaced an earlier proposal using the wording 
“partly in written books and partly in unwritten tradition,” a formula that 
some parties found objectionable because it implied that scripture and 
tradition each was incomplete and only partly conveyed the truths of the 
gospel (Schelkens 2010, 85). Josef Geiselmann had revived this issue during 
the 1950s and Stanislaus Lyonnet further complicated the situation by 
pointedly arguing that the Tridentine contributions to original sin doctrine 
were not supported by scripture.8 Given the complexity of this context, it is 
not surprising that the composition of the council’s Dogmatic Constitution 
on Divine Revelation became contentious. 
During 1960 and 1961, the Preparatory Theological Commission, headed 
by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, Secretary of the Holy Office, drafted several 
initial schemata concerning the sources of doctrine and its preservation. 
Among these schemata, De fontibus revelationis (On the Sources of Revela-
tion), especially emphasized a broadly understood concept of tradition as 
a more extensive source of revelation than scripture (Baum 1967; Schelkens 
2010). Another schema, De deposito fidei pure custodiendo (Defending Intact 
the Deposit of Faith), included specific material pertaining to original sin, 
8 See, for example, Geiselmann 1958 and Lyonnet 1955 and 1956.
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particularly in its Chapter VIII, “Original Sin in the Children of Adam.” As 
might be expected from a commission predisposed to emphasize tradition 
more than scriptural exegesis, the wording of Humani generis was expanded 
in De deposito fidei to include the assertion that acceptance of polygenism 
would be to “contradict Catholic doctrine.”9 During 1962 the preliminary 
schemata were pre-circulated to the Fathers of the Council who in many 
cases sought commentary from theologians before submitting their as-
sessments to the Papal Secretary of State, Amleto Cicognani. For example, 
critiques of De deposito fidei were provided by Karl Rahner for Cardinal Franz 
König, Joseph Ratzinger for Cardinal Joseph Frings, and Pieter Mulders for 
Archbishop Giuseppe Beltrami. These responses were generally very critical. 
The document was considered too reminiscent of the “syllabus of errors” 
approach to doctrinal uniformity. It condemned positions still under debate 
among Catholic theologians and had the negative tone of an admonition 
from the Holy Office rather than the celebratory affirmation of Catholicism 
called for by John XXIII. Ratzinger, for example, concluded that De deposito 
fidei was “in no way suitable but is so faulty that as it stands it cannot be 
proposed to the Council” (Wicks 2008, 267). During the first session of 
Vatican II, De deposito fidei was not considered worthy of discussion and 
was never put to a vote; the topics of evolution, monogenism, and original 
sin would not be addressed in detail in any conciliar documents.10 
9 An English translation of the schema De deposito fidei pure custodiendo has been provided 
by Joseph Komonchak. One passage of Chapter VIII pertained directly to monogenism: 
“The sacred Synod, therefore, rejects the views of those who assert either that after Adam 
there have been here on earth true men who did not derive by natural generation from that 
one first parent or that Adam represents some multitude of first parents; such views con-
tradict Catholic doctrine. For it is not at all apparent how such views are compatible with 
what the sources of revealed truth and the acts of the Church’s Magisterium present about 
original sin, which proceeds from the sin truly committed by the one Adam and which 
is transmitted to all by generation, and which is in each person as his own.” https://ja-
komonchak.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/defending-the-deposit-of-faith.pdf. Jared Wicks 
attributes the editorial composition of the document to Luigi Ciappi (Wicks 2018, 53).
10 For full citations to brief references to Adam or original sin in the relevant documents, 
see Vandervelde 1981, 46–47. For example, Gaudium et Spes included an allusion to Saint 
Paul’s oft-cited correlation: “For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to 
come, namely Christ the Lord” (Gaudium et Spes, ⁋ 22). For the procedural history of De 
deposito fidei and De fontibus revelationis, see Wicks 2001, Wicks 2018, and Schelkens 2010.
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Based upon similar widespread dissatisfaction and lengthy debate, the 
more foundational schema De fontibus revelationis was removed from the 
council’s agenda through an intervention by John XXIII and a reconstituted 
committee was assigned to rewrite it. Ultimately, on November 18th of 
1965, Pope Paul VI approved the final version of Vatican II’s Dei Verbum, 
the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. Although the fraught 
relationship between scripture and tradition was not resolved, Dei Verbum 
did not include the preference given to tradition in De deposito fidei and 
it encouraged exegetes to apply modern analytic techniques to scripture. 
To search out the intention of the sacred writers, attention should be given, 
among other things, to “literary forms.” For truth is set forth and expressed 
differently in texts which are variously historical, prophetic, poetic, or of other 
forms of discourse. The interpreter must investigate what meaning the sacred 
writer intended to express and actually expressed in particular circumstances 
by using contemporary literary forms in accordance with the situation of his 
own time and culture (Paul VI 1965).
The import of Dei Verbum, and Vatican II more generally, for the issue of 
monogenism thus was important but muted. The effort by representatives of 
the Holy Office to have polygenesis declared contradictory to Catholic faith 
was forestalled and historically based scriptural exegesis was encouraged. On 
the other hand, theological discussion of original sin had in practice already 
shifted focus from biblical sources to the implications of tradition; Dei 
Verbum offered little guidance for this endeavor. As John Thiel has recently 
argued, “Dei Verbum’s clear teaching on the legitimate role of historical 
criticism in the interpretation of Scripture provides the proper precedent for 
addressing the role of historical criticism in the interpretation of tradition” 
(Thiel 2020, 231). Edward Yarnold had already clearly expressed this point in 
1971. “It has rightly been pointed out that it is inconsistent to reject funda-
mentalism in the exegesis of the Bible while insisting on a fundamentalist 
interpretation of the Church’s definitions of dogma. The same interpretive 
techniques apply in both areas” (Yarnold 1971, 88). In the specific case of 
original sin, elucidation of the distinction between the substance of doctrine 
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and its historical formulation through a particular means of expression 
was pursued with new enthusiasm during the years immediately after the 
Council. The abandoned schema De deposito fidei would be one of the last 
efforts by members of the Roman Curia to invoke tradition to insist that 
polygenism be excluded from Catholic doctrine. The contrast between the 
generally positive outlook of Dei Verbum and the prohibitive strictures that 
had been proposed in De deposito fidei indicates that a crucial turning point 
had been reached and that concern for the preservation of monogenism as 
at least theologically certain had decidedly waned.
4. Post-Vatican II Developments of the 1960s
During the Vatican II years, and throughout the 1960s, publications on the 
topics of original sin and polygenism increased exponentially. The elimi-
nation of the Index of Prohibited Books in 1966 was symptomatic of the fact 
that the Holy See was no longer capable of efficiently monitoring the sheer 
volume of modern publications. At the end of 1965 Paul VI also reconfigured 
the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office as the Sacred Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF). The pope himself became the Prefect of 
the CDF with Alfredo Ottaviani, the former Secretary of the Holy Office, 
now serving as CDF Pro-Prefect. In 1968 Paul VI withdrew from the CDF, 
Ottaviani resigned, and Franjo Šeper became Prefect until 1981. During the 
two decades after Vatican II Ottaviani and Šeper thus were the two most 
influential members of the Roman Curia with respect to determination of 
doctrinal orthodoxy. Two generalizations characterize developments during 
this period. Theological discourse featured novel presentations of original sin 
that either pushed monogenism to the periphery as irrelevant or explicitly 
incorporated polygenism. Secondly, the CDF did not raise objections to 
polygenism even though, on a straightforward reading of Humani generis, 
it should not have been acceptable.
Terminology had finally stabilized by this point and polygenism was 
rarely confused with polyphyletism, the racial polygenism of the nineteenth 
century. For example, Pieter Smulders articulated this distinction in a re-
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freshingly clear analysis, initially written in 1963 (Smulders 1967). He also 
argued that the essential doctrine of original sin does not necessarily include 
monogenism, even though this is the narrative form in which the doctrine 
has traditionally been presented. The methodology of Neo-Darwinism 
obviously relies upon polygenism, but, as had been pointed out by so many 
others, Smulders agreed that empirical evidence alone could not absolutely 
rule out monogenism, the longstanding preference of the magisterium.
While Smulders’ point was commonplace among conservative theolo-
gians, more innovative thinkers took the theology of the 1960s in directions 
where a defense of monogenism rarely arose. In his historical analysis of this 
period, George Vandervelde used the terms “situationalist” and “personalist” 
to refer to two general approaches (Vandervelde 1981). Largely inspired by 
the Dutch Jesuit Piet Schoonenberg, the situationalist school included vari-
ations later developed by Karl Rahner, Karl-Heinz Weger and André-Marie 
Dubarle, among others. Influential personalists included Alfred Vanneste 
and Urs Baumann. In addition to taking a Christocentric orientation, these 
theologians shifted emphasis to peccatum originale originatum, the present 
reality of the fallen human condition, as opposed to peccatum originale origi-
nans, the origin or cause of this condition.11 Using this scholastic distinction 
introduced by Augustine, the discussion of monogenism and polygenism 
pertains primarily to original sin originans and only indirectly to original 
sin originatum. In both the situationalist and the personalist approaches, 
monogenism was not so much refuted as it was ignored as a scientific issue 
irrelevant to the discussion of peccatum originale originatum. As is frequently 
the case in the history of philosophy, some unresolved questions are simply 
left behind by a change in focus, a change in the topic of conversation.12 Some 
11 This distinction is generally preserved linguistically in English, French, and Italian by ex-
pressing peccatum originale originans as originating original sin, péché originel originant 
and peccato originale originante respectively. Similarly, peccatum originale originatum be-
comes originated original sin, péché originel originé, and peccato originale originato. In 
German, the distinction is sometimes expressed by using Ursünde for peccatum originale 
originans and Erbsünde for peccatum originale originatum. See Gutwender 1967, 433.
12 See McMahon 2002b, 202.
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details of this process are worth consideration as an important transitional 
phase in the disengagement from monogenism.
Piet Schoonenberg provided pivotal inspiration for the situationist 
school of thought in which original sin is understood as a collective state 
of sin, the “sin of the world.” Here Schoonenberg adopted the phrase used 
by John the Baptist in John 1:29, “Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes 
away the sin of the world,” emphasizing that John referred to the sin of 
the world, not the sin of Adam. He characterized original sin as the “being 
in situation” (Situiertsein) of each person within a spiritually hostile envi-
ronment. Recognizing that traditional theological discussion of original 
sin had concentrated on the sin of Adam, Schoonenberg set out to refocus 
attention on the present human condition, as in his only direct allusion to 
monogenism in his 1962 essay.
Did the first sin of humanity also change our human nature biologically? If so, it 
still also embodied our situation for the “death of the soul.” If not, it is merely the 
terrible beginning of the dominance of sin which clearly expresses itself in the 
personal sinning of each person. The answer to this question, which also is closely 
tied to the question as to whether monogenism is postulated by the Church’s 
doctrine of original sin, still appears unclear to us (Schoonenberg 1962, 68–69).
Schoonenberg considered the origin of the sin of the world, and the issue of 
monogenism in particular, to be relatively unimportant and he gave much 
more attention to an analysis of the consequences of sin, the debased state 
of humanity in need of redemption. Schoonenberg’s ideas became widely 
accessible through his 1965 book Man and Sin; after discussing at some 
length his conception of the sin of the world, he analyzed the history of the 
magisterium’s teachings on original sin. 
An influence of more than one ancestor – that is, polygenism – is not envisaged 
by the Fathers of Trent. But since they did not intend to say more than that the 
unity of original sin consists only in its origin, they do not propose as an article 
of faith the image which they held of that origin. … We do not find in Trent 
any direct reason for making monogenism a doctrine of faith (Schoonenberg 
1965, 175).
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Schoonenberg admitted that the most difficult issue for his approach is 
the origin of the sinful situation. Instead of using the scholastic terminology 
of peccatum originans and peccatum originatum, he simply asked “Does that 
origin lie in ‘Adam’ or in ‘the world’? Should Adam perhaps be equated with 
‘the world’; that is, with sinful humanity?” (Schoonenberg 1965, 187). Here 
it was crucial to separate the issue of monogenism from the central core of 
original sin doctrine, or, as Schoonenberg put this point, “the theological 
question can only be whether that descent from one couple of first parents 
is or is not contained in the dogma of original sin. If this is not the case, 
the question whether we descend from one couple matters only (if at all) 
for biology or paleontology” (Schoonenberg 1965, 188). Schoonenberg’s 
interpretation of Humani generis was that although polygenism has not 
been shown to be compatible with the traditional theology of original 
sin, investigation of this issue might eventually resolve it. Granting the 
universal effect of original sin, “from this point of view there is no need to 
admit one sinning couple of first parents – or, to put it positively, on this 
last point, too, there is not any difference between original sin and the sin 
of the world” (Schoonenberg 1965, 190–191).
Critics such as Anthony Padovano found shortcomings in Schoonenberg’s 
account, but not solely due to a failure to require monogenism. In analyzing 
the Tridentine formulation of the unity of original sin, Padovano commented: 
Original sin is “one by origin.” This phrase militates less against the possibility of 
polygenism than it does against Schoonenberg’s quasi-identification of original 
sin with sin of the world. The latter theory seems too diverse and too gradual 
to assign unity of origin with any real meaning. The progressive, non-universal 
sinfulness of our history before Christ, which Schoonenberg depicts, seems to 
contradict “one by origin” (Padovano 1967, 114).
This criticism raised the most obvious problem for Schoonenberg. While 
the sin of the world may be a valuable description of peccatum originatum, 
it is problematic to also equate it with peccatum originans.
9(1)/2021 95
CAT H O L I C I S M A N D E VO L U T I O N: PO LYG E N I S M A N D O R I G I N A L S I N (PA RT I I )
We must acknowledge the uniqueness of original sin. I would find it, therefore, 
difficult to equate original sin with “sin of the world.” The latter may be a result 
of the former; the latter may have a much closer relationship to the former than 
we realized; the latter and the former are, however, distinct from each other 
(Padovano 1967, 120).
Acceptance of Schoonenberg’s approach was generally correlated with the 
degree to which monogenism and peccatum originans were not considered 
to be central issues to original sin theology. Supporters such as Karl-Heinz 
Weger and André-Marie Dubarle were primarily interested in advancing 
the idea of original sin as the “sin of the world.”
We see original sin now as a truly tragic and actual situation: no longer merely 
the loss of wonderful gifts at a great remove from our day and condition, but 
the moral and religious perversion in which every man finds himself inevitably 
plunged by reason of his birth into a perverted environment: ignorant of God, 
or idolatry and a more or less profound corruption (A.- M. Dubarle 1964, 244).
While situationalists did not emphasize direct confrontation with the 
scriptural narrative of the origin of sin, Alfred Vanneste inspired a more 
radical personalist school of thought by insisting that genuine sin must 
always be a freely chosen individual act. For Vanneste, the terminology 
of original “sin” is simply a conceptual proxy for the universality of both 
personal sin and the need for redemption. In short, “Original sin is the 
need of every man for redemption by Christ” (Vanneste 1967, 209). From 
this perspective, the mythological embellishments relied upon in scripture 
have lost their utility. 
First, our aim is to free the theology of original sin from the insurmountable 
difficulties of the traditional historical framework. How many hypotheses have 
tried to explain how a sin can be inherited! Nor should the explanation of original 
sin be tied to some other scientific or pseudo-scientific theory – monogenism, 
polygenism, even evolution. Original sin is concerned only with salvation history 
(Vanneste 1967, 213).
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As had Schoonenberg, Vanneste swept aside concerns about monogenism 
as irrelevant. “It is our opinion that the peccatum originale originans has 
only a symbolical significance left” (Vanneste 1975, 180).
From a less iconoclastic perspective, Zoltán Alszeghy and Maurice Flick, 
Jesuits at the Gregorian University in Rome, co-authored two influential 
publications that were widely discussed in the literature of this period 
(Alszeghy and Flick, 1965 and 1966). They accepted biological polygenism 
in the sense that Adam and Eve would have descended from human pre-
Adamites and lived within a large human population of co-Adamites.13 
They also proposed, as had Blandino, what they considered to be a more 
important theological monogenism. That is, Adam and Eve were postulated 
to be the first humans to reach a stage of psychological development ap-
propriate for the reception of sanctifying grace and prerequisite for moral 
judgment and potential sin. However, unlike Blandino, Alszeghy and Flick 
did not accept the necessity of the doctrine that the effects of Adam’s sin 
always propagate through physical procreation. Instead, they considered 
the initial solidarity and unity of humanity to be such that all members 
would be affected by Adam acting as their “corporate personality,” a concept 
they appropriated from H. Wheeler Robinson (Alszeghy and Flick 1966, 
223–224). Although James Mackey tried to discredit corporate personality 
as a simplistic reification, and John Rogerson criticized Robinson’s reliance 
upon questionable anthropology (Mackey 1967, 111–114; Rogerson 1970), 
the idea did gain some traction among theologians interested in combining 
biological polygenism with theological monogenism (Yarnold 1971, 36).
At the invitation of Paul VI, concentrated discussion of these issues took 
place during a July 1966 symposium on the mystery of original sin. Under the 
direction of Edouard Dhanis, the thirteen participants included Alszeghy, 
Flick, and Rahner, as well as Marie-Michel Labourdette and Charles Moeller, 
the Secretary of the CDF. Alszeghy and Flick had just published a digest of 
their polygenism hypothesis in the Civiltà Cattolica, so it must have been 
familiar to both the pope and the symposium participants (A.-M. Dubarle 
13 In an earlier paper, Flick had explicitly rejected polygenism as “impossible” to reconcile 
with the dogma of original sin (Flick 1947, 557).
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1966). In his opening address, Paul VI placed the topic in historical context 
and acknowledged the relevance of recent scientific progress. However, he 
also upheld a prohibition on polygenism if it precludes attribution of the 
first sin to the individual Adam.
It is evident, therefore, that the explanations which some modern authors 
give of original sin will seem to you irreconcilable with Catholic doctrine. For 
these authors start with the presupposition of polygenesis, which has not been 
demonstrated. They deny, more or less clearly, that the sin committed at the very 
dawn of history and which originated such an avalanche of evils in mankind, 
was first of all the disobedience of Adam, the “first man” and figure of him 
who was to come. … Consequently, such explanations are not in accord with 
the teachings of Sacred Scripture, of Sacred Tradition and of the Magisterium 
of the Church (Paul VI 1966, 81).
It is not clear whether the pope had Alszeghy and Flick in mind when he 
referred to “some modern authors.” They did attribute the first sin to Adam 
although by accepting biological polygenism they did not posit him as the 
“first man.”
In a commentary on the pope’s speech, Robert Rouquette noted that 
subtle changes had been made for the published version. The initial press 
release description of the status of polygenism was that it is “anything but 
firmly demonstrated;” the Osservatore Romano publication read simply that 
it “has not been demonstrated.” The press release version also ascribed 
original sin to “a single first man, Adam, progenitor of the entire human 
race,” while the published version referred to “Adam, the ‘first man’ and 
figure of him who was to come” (Rouquette 1966, 382). Rouquette surmised 
that the changes in wording indicated that there was still uncertainty on 
how the doctrine should be understood and that the pope had not ruled 
out research on the topic. As Rouquette cautiously remarked, “We restrict 
ourselves to confirming that, between the first and second version of his 
discourse, Paul VI mitigated the affirmation of the unicity of Adam, and, in 
the definitive edition, the qualifier of first man applied to Adam is placed in 
quotation marks” (Rouquette 1966, 388). For Rouquette himself, the tension 
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between personal responsibility and the idea of inherited guilt made the 
entire topic of original sin problematic.
Karl Rahner was not deterred by the pope’s introductory warning and 
in fact used the ensuing symposium as the occasion to report that he had 
changed his mind and no longer considered polygenism to be theologically 
objectionable. He summarized his new perspective in a 1967 essay and 
expanded it for a 1970 publication in which he commented that Paul VI’s 
speech had not prevented the symposium participants from considering 
polygenism compatible with original sin doctrine. As he wrote in December 
of 1967:
The question of polygenism within Catholic theology may with all due respect for 
the interpretation of Humani Generis be treated as still open. There is certainly 
no dogma of monogenism. Cautious theological reflection enables us to show 
today that Trent’s dogma of original sin does not exclude polygenism. The 
two can coexist. On this point I have reappraised my own earlier view (Rahner 
1967a, xii).
Rahner presented his new position as a thesis to be defended.
In the present state of theology and natural science, it cannot be demonstrated 
with certainty that polygenism is incompatible with the orthodox doctrine of 
original sin. Therefore, it is preferable and more prudent that the magisterium 
refrain from censuring polygenism (Rahner 1970, 185).
Rahner explained that he used a negative formulation because polygenism 
is a scientific hypothesis that cannot be deduced theologically. He offered 
two polygenetic hypotheses as legitimate settings for the occurrence of 
original sin. One possibility was that a single individual sinned and thereby 
blocked “the grace-transmitting function” of the entire human population. 
This was essentially the process he had hypothetically discussed in 1954 
and then discarded as incompatible with the teachings of Trent unless the 
propagation of sin transpires in a manner other than through physical 
descent, a possibility he now accepted. Rahner also suggested another 
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option that would involve a collective sin so that Adam represents “the 
concrete expression used for that one group,” the population that caused 
“the consequences which traditional teaching attaches to this sin” (Rahner 
1967b, 71). By introducing these two versions of polygenism as theologically 
legitimate, Rahner unapologetically departed from the strictures of Humani 
generis. In 1969 he reiterated that “in spite of Humani Generis, some form 
of polygenism may be prudently maintained” and that “it does not matter 
whether ‘Adam’ was an individual or a word for humanitas originans. It 
does not matter whether the sin which set up a situation of blight from the 
beginning was committed by an individual or by many among this humanitas 
originans. It follows that monogenism is not a necessary element of the 
dogma of original sin” (Rahner 1969, 107). Rahner abandoned his earlier 
indirect argument in support of monogenism by accepting that universal 
redemption through Christ requires only the biological and historical unity of 
the human race and does not require the additional restraint of monogenism 
(Rahner 1967b, 66–67; 1970, 196–199). The presence of Charles Moeller 
of the CDF at the 1966 symposium where Rahner initially presented these 
ideas should not be overlooked. In light of the unsuccessful effort to place 
a stricture on polygenism through the Vatican II preliminary schema De 
deposito fidei, the fact that no proceedings were initiated against either 
Rahner or Alszeghy and Flick is a confirmation that a turning point had 
been reached.
1967 was also a noteworthy year due to publications by Francisco José 
Ayala and René Lavocat as well as new contributions from Blandino and 
Henri Rondet. Ayala had been ordained a Dominican priest in 1960, although 
he immediately reached an agreement with his order that he would leave 
the priesthood five years later. During that interval he studied genetics at 
Columbia University and received his doctorate in 1964 under the supervision 
of Theodosius Dobzhansky, author of the 1962 volume Mankind Evolving. 
As a research geneticist, Ayala followed Dobzhansky in rejecting Carleton 
Stevens Coon’s polyphyletic speculations and found the idea of monogenism 
simply untenable.
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That all living men are derived from a single evolutionary line of development, 
what is called monophyletism, is strongly supported by the available evidence 
and the understanding of evolutionary processes. Most evolutionists reject 
the opinion that the developments leading from non-human ancestors to the 
races of modern man occurred independently in several lines of descent. If 
monophyletism is strongly supported by the evidence from the natural sciences, 
monogenism certainly is not (Ayala 1967, 14).
Ayala warned that theologians such as John O’Rourke (O’Rourke 1965) were 
inadequately informed about the consensus among geneticists concerning 
polygenism and that “from the point of view of the natural sciences only 
polygenism makes sense. Evolution does not happen in individuals, but in 
populations.” Furthermore, “There is no known mechanism by which the 
human species might have arisen by a single step in one or two individuals 
only, from whom the rest of mankind would have descended” (Ayala 1967, 
15). Ayala concluded that Catholic theologians are confronted by a difficult 
dilemma.
I can see only two possible alternate solutions for the Catholic theologian. 
One, to find an explanation which would make polygenism compatible with the 
doctrine of original sin – an explanation that, according to Pius XII, does not 
appear likely to be forthcoming. Two, to bring additional theological hypotheses 
in support of monogenism. Such hypotheses are not available from, and are 
consistently opposed by, the natural sciences (Ayala 1967, 16).
Although Ayala did not venture a theological solution of his own, he com-
mended theologians who attempted what Pius XII declared difficult, the 
adjustment of original sin doctrine to allow polygenism, the approach Ayala 
clearly preferred.14 Among those Ayala mentioned was Robert North who 
noted that polygenism had become such an integral aspect of evolutionary 
science that there was no scientific reason to expect any radically different 
process for the transition to Homo sapiens. North was a strong advocate of 
14 Ayala cited Marie-Michel Labourdette, Robert North, André-Marie Dubarle, Piet Schoo-
nenberg, Piet Smulders, and Robert Francoeur.
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Teilhard’s ideas and credited him for helping to shift theological attention 
away from skepticism about polygenism to a more fundamental reconsid-
eration of original sin doctrine (North 1963). Furthermore, the theological 
status of monogenism was unclear. “Is it a truth of revelation? Is it a fact 
of partially human knowledge, yet genuinely certain and therefore of 
itself unalterable? Is it a reformable decree of authority? No one can claim 
a consensus of experts for his answer today” (North 1967, 57). 
Abbé René Lavocat was sympathetic to North’s assessment. As Director 
of the Laboratoire de Paléontologie des Vertébrés at the Ecole Pratique des 
Hautes Etudes in Montpellier, he agreed with the scientific consensus that 
human origins took place through gradual genetic changes in a population 
and not due to an “exceptional mutation” in one or two individuals (Lav-
ocat 1967a, 584). Lavocat speculated that human ensoulment could have 
happened as long ago as Homo habilis and he shared the view of Blandino, 
Alszeghy, and Flick that ensoulment preceded the gradual development of 
the moral consciousness prerequisite for sin. He also interpreted Humani 
generis as an invitation to investigate how polygenism might be compatible 
with innovative theological understanding of original sin. Perhaps Adam was 
the conduit through which God granted humanity an elevated state of grace, 
a status Adam initially conveyed to all members of his species. The effect of 
Adam’s sin might then be a termination of this condition throughout the 
species. This disastrous spiritual effect would subsequently be shared by all 
humans but would not need to be transmitted through physical propagation 
(per generationem), that is, it would not necessarily take place through direct 
physical descent. As had Alszeghy and Flick, Lavocat combined biological 
polygenism with monoculpisme, assignment of responsibility for the initial 
sin to a single individual (Lavocat 1967a, 593). 
Schoonenberg’s conception of original sin as “the sin of the world” 
had a significant impact on Giovanni Blandino. Although in 1962 he had 
relied upon the role of an historical Adam, upon further consideration, 
his calculation of the time required for Adam to become an ancestor of all 
surviving human lineages now struck him as having an “artificial rigor,” 
and to have God choose to sanctify only Adam’s descendants seemed too 
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arbitrary (Blandino 1977b, 74). In 1967 he took a very different approach.15 
He now characterized the Catholic doctrine of original sin as the assertion 
that all humans are born in a physical and spiritual state of “dying” caused 
by personal sin. From Blandino’s new perspective, “the originating original 
sin would not only consist of the sin of the first man, but also the sins of all 
other men” (Blandino 1977b, 62), or, as he later expressed this point more 
fully, “the originating original sin would be constituted, in the first place 
and in an emblematic way, by the first grave sin (that with which sin entered 
into the world), but it would also be constituted, and not any less, by the 
sins of all the other men” (Blandino 1989, 161). Blandino conceded that this 
interpretation was contrary to the constraint Paul VI had urged in his 1966 
speech but he nevertheless denied that the deposit of the faith includes “the 
uniqueness of the originating original sin” (Blandino 1977b, 60; 1989, 159). 
This starting point allowed him to deny that revealed doctrine includes 
attribution of original sin to the single sin of Adam and the transmission of 
the effects of that sin to all humans through physical descent. Rather, “the 
sin which caused the ruin of man was not the sin of a single man, but the sins 
of all men in general (Blandino 1977b, 65; 1989, 164). Understanding original 
sin from this perspective “requires neither monogenism nor polygenism, 
but follows as equally valid in any form of natural evolution” (Blandino 
1977b, 70; 1989, 169). For scientific reasons, Blandino clearly preferred the 
polygenism option; he denied that monogenism was revealed doctrine but 
he also was careful to include a caveat that he could be in error (Blandino 
1977c, 90). To his critics, Blandino’s emphasis on God’s foreknowledge of 
the inevitability of human sin overshadowed his articulation of the sin 
of the world. André-Marie Dubarle found that aspect of his presentation 
excessively “artificial” (A.-M. Dubarle 1969, 102).
15 Originally published as a short pamphlet (Blandino 1967), his 1967 essay was included in 
a later collection (Blandino 1977a) and partially incorporated into a 1989 English version 
(Blandino 1989). Blandino acknowledged the merit of Schoonenberg’s “sin of the world” 
approach but added that “the sin of the world has influenced the very structure of human 
nature. And the sin of the world which has influenced a given man is not constituted by 
the sins of the others (of the surrounding environment), but is constituted by all the sins 
of humanity and also and above all by the sins of that same man” (Blandino 1989, 172).
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That Rahner, Lavocat, and Blandino were not unusual in their disengage-
ment from monogenism was thoroughly demonstrated in James Connor’s 
1968 survey article. He agreed with many other commentators that the 
Council of Trent had not directly addressed the choice between monogenism 
and polygenism. The point of emphasis at Trent was that all humans acquired 
the effects of original sin through propagatione from the initial perpetrators, 
traditionally referred to as Adam and Eve; this literary expression of mono-
genism was simply assumed without supportive argument and was never 
intended to be taught as doctrine. After noting how Rahner had withdrawn 
his earlier argument that monogenism is theologically certain, Connor gave 
detailed attention to the work of Alszeghy, Flick, Schoonenberg, Rondet, 
and Vanneste, as well as Pierre Grelot, Ansfridus Hulsbosch, and Engelbert 
Gutwenger. For example, Grelot proposed a “mitigated polygenism” in 
which, even if Adam and Eve are assumed to have initiated sin, they would 
have done so within a tightly integrated population in which the effects of 
sin were realized. Connor’s sympathetic conclusion was that:
there has been a progressive change of focus in the doctrine of original sin from 
man’s solidarity in sin with Adam to the human condition as not-yet-in-Christ. 
To be in “original sin” is simply to be outside of Christ prior to the possibility of 
free personal decision for or against Christ (Connor 1968, 238–239).
During the 1940s, Henri Rondet had foreseen and encouraged this 
reorientation of original sin theology (Hofmann 2020b, 127–128). In the 
immediate aftermath of Humani generis, he had been removed from his 
position as Prefect of Studies at the Lyon-Fourvière Jesuit house. Allowed to 
return to teaching at the end of the 1950s, he once again wrote extensively 
on original sin after Vatican II, using an approach quite similar to Blandino’s. 
Praising the Bouyssonie brothers as “far-seeing theologians” due to the 
questions they had broached in 1935 (Hofmann 2020b, 123–124), Rondet 
offered his own “working hypothesis.”
Without denying that chronologically there may have been a first man, without 
raising any question on the subject of monogenism or polygenism, the thesis 
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affirms, from the start, that Adam is Man, mankind taken as a whole, which, 
in a second dialectical epoch, appears in the sight of God as separated by sin 
from this Christ whose role will be to make it one with him (Rondet 1967, 313; 
1972, 263–264).
This Adam is Man perspective required theologians to transcend the linear 
human chronology explored by scientific research. “Original sin in us has 
as its cause an actual, but collective, sin, formed by the sum of the personal 
sins of men of all times” (Rondet 1967, 321; 1972, 270–271). Connor wel-
comed these innovations as a collective indication that theologians were 
approaching a new basis for consensus.
Finally, all must agree that it is most gratifying to read theologians of such 
stature who, with their characteristic scholarly humility, have attempted in 
their tentative hypotheses to free the doctrine of original sin from a structure 
which had proven too narrow to embrace the fundamental Christian doctrine 
of sinful man’s need for salvation in Christ (Connor 1968, 240).
With publications reliant upon polygenism becoming so extensive, it is 
remarkable that during this period they did not generate any high-profile 
cases of intervention by the Holy Office or the CDF. In a 1968 lecture, Rahner 
was confident that:
we may surely say that the development of Catholic theology since ‘Humani 
Generis’ has made such advances (advances that have been tolerated by the 
Church’s magisterium) that the opinion that polygenism is not irreconciliable 
with the doctrine of original sin is no longer exposed to the danger of being 
censured by the authorities of the Church (Rahner 1974, 252).
The secrecy maintained for Congregation proceedings of course means that 
archival research may eventually reveal cases where pressure was privately 
brought to bear upon polygenist authors during the 1960s just as had been 
the case for Teilhard during the 1920s. However, it is safe to tentatively 
conclude that this did not happen, especially since polygenism was not the 
point at issue when the Holy Office or the CDF did raise issues about original 
sin doctrine. For example, in 1961 the French Jesuit Stanislaus Lyonnet was 
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temporarily suspended from his position at the Pontifical Biblical Institute 
in Rome where he had taught since 1943. As part of his widely cited research 
into Paul’s letters to the Romans, Lyonnet had published a 1956 article in 
which he sought to explicate the nature of sin between the time of Adam 
and that of Moses, a period in which neither the initial justice of Eden nor 
the law of Moses was in effect (Lyonnet 1956). There obviously was sin and 
death throughout this period and Lyonnet’s paraphrase of Paul’s text was 
that, although death entered the world due to Adam’s sin, it also perdures 
because all men sin. The topic of polygenism never arose in the article in 
question and could not have initiated the decision to suspend Lyonnet. Based 
upon his study of this case, Brian Harrison concluded that the Holy Office 
apparently thought that, in his interpretation of Paul, Lyonnet gave too 
much weight to the effect of personal sin (Harrison 2012, 4). Toleration of 
polygenism clearly had become commonplace in the midst of concern about 
other innovations in original sin doctrine; this adjustment was especially 
striking during the CDF’s response to A New Catechism and the proceedings 
enacted against the biblical scholar Herbert Haag.
5. The Supplement to A New Catechism  
and the Investigation of Herbert Haag
Two 1966 publications involving original sin provoked aggressive reactions 
by the CDF. The first was De Nieuwe Katechismus (A New Catechism), issued 
on behalf of the Bishops of the Netherlands and due largely to the efforts of 
Piet Schoonenberg and the Dominican theologian Edward Schillebeeckx. The 
other was a short volume by Herbert Haag, a prominent Tübingen professor 
of the Old Testament, who argued that Catholic original sin doctrine does 
not have a scriptural basis. The CDF responded to A New Catechism expe-
ditiously but the Haag investigation dragged on into the 1970s and never 
was fully resolved. The two cases provide ample evidence that polygenism 
was no longer a serious point of concern to the CDF.
Published just three months after Paul VI’s symposium on original sin, De 
Nieuwe Katechismus was produced through the Higher Catechetical Institute 
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(Hoger Katechetisch Instituut) in Nijmegen (De Nieuwe Katechismus, 1966). 
Schoonenberg had been associated with the Institute since 1957 and also 
taught dogmatic theology with Schillebeeckx at the Catholic University of 
Nijmegen beginning in 1964. Designed for adults, the catechism had an 
expository format rather than the question-and-answer structure often 
used in catechisms for children. The book was enormously popular and an 
English translation was quickly released in the United States (A New Cate-
chism, 1967). The section on “The Power of Sin” included a relatively short 
discussion of the initial chapters of Genesis. Although polygenism was not 
directly mentioned, the topic of original sin was introduced through some 
telling comments on Paul’s references to Adam in Romans 5. 
At first sight it seems that his intention is to stress the fact that it was through 
one man that sin came into the world. But the repetition of the word “one”, 
occasioned by the view of the world history as it existed in Paul’s time, is only 
part of the literary dress, not the message. What this difficult passage teaches 
is that though sin and death ruled over mankind, grace and eternal life, the 
restoration, has come in greater abundance through Jesus (A New Catechism 
1967, 262).
In the pages that followed, the most important passage devoted to original 
sin showed an obvious imprint from Schoonenberg’s approach; the unity of 
humanity and the “oneness” of sin can be understood without reliance upon 
the traditional inheritance narrative that is not part of revealed doctrine.
They looked to “human nature” which was propagated by bodily generation 
since sinful Adam. But this explanation of the collectivity or “oneness” of sin 
is not something that has been directly revealed. It is not part of the direct 
intention of revelation (what is per se revealed). The unity of the human race, 
according to scripture, is not based on propagation (“Greek, barbarian or Jew”) 
but on the call by the one Father. The oneness of sin is to be sought on the 
same level, though here in man’s refusal. It reaches us, not merely by way of 
generation, but from all sides, along all the ways in which men have contact 
with one another. The sin which stains others was not only committed by an 
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Adam at the beginning of man’s story, but by “Adam”, man, every man. It is “the 
sin of the world” (A New Catechism 1967, 266).
Furthermore, the traditional causal linkage between death and sin is not 
essential.
There is a very special and mysterious connection in our minds between sin 
and death. Holy Scripture sometimes expresses this by saying that through 
sin death came into the world. But since the beginnings are obscure to us, the 
beginning of biological death is also obscure. What we do see, when we look at 
the course of the history of salvation, is that along with sin death lost its sting 
(A New Catechism 1967, 269).
Although published with the Imprimatur of Cardinal Bernardus Alfrink, De 
Nieuwe Katechismus was immediately delated to the CDF by a Dutch group 
of lay Catholics who generated considerable publicity in the popular press.16 
A commission of Cardinals was appointed to assess the book and, following 
some unproductive meetings with Dutch representatives, on 15 October of 
1968 a “Declaration” was issued in which ten issues were listed as needing 
clarification.17 The second of these judgments addressed “The Fall of Man 
in Adam” and warned that:
in the New Catechism the doctrine of the Church is to be faithfully proposed, 
that man in the beginning of history rebelled against God (Cf. Conc. Vat. II, Const. 
Gaudium el Spes, n. 13, 22) and so lost for himself and his offspring that sanctity 
and justice in which he had been constituted, and handed on a true state of sin 
to all through propagation of human nature. Certainly those expressions must 
be avoided which could signify that original sin is only contracted by individual 
new members of the human family in this sense that from their very coming 
16 A published letter addressed to Paul VI and objecting to De Nieuwe Katechismus included 
the assertion that “As regards original sin, the book denies that we contract it as a sin in-
herited from one original ancestor and transmitted to us by physical reproduction” (Herd-
er Correspondence 1967, 94).
17 The commission consisted of Cardinals Joseph Frings, Joseph Lefebvre, Lorenz Jaeger, Er-
menegildo Florit, Michael Browne and Charles Journet with Pietro Palazzini serving as 
Secretary.
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into the world, they are exposed within themselves to the influence of human 
society where sin reigns, and so are started initially on the way of sin (Frings 
et al. 1968).
Although this guideline included no references to Adam and Eve as a mono-
genetic first human couple, it did insist that the effect of sin was passed 
down through “propagation.” It also clearly cautioned against giving the 
impression that original sin could be thought of as solely the result of ex-
posure to sinful society, no doubt because of references in A New Catechism 
to “the sin of the world.” During the next few months it was decided that, 
instead of revising A New Catechism, future editions would simply include 
as an appendix a copy of The Supplement to A New Catechism, a booklet 
that provided expanded discussion of the Declaration points of emphasis.18
Published in 1969, The Supplement listed Edouard Dhanis and Jan Visser 
as authors on behalf of the Commission of Cardinals. It is not clear who 
actually wrote the lengthy section on original sin. Among the Cardinals on 
the Commission, Charles Journet may have been consulted since he had 
included a hypothetical example of polygenism in his 1951 Petit Catéchisme. 
The Supplement preserved the core of a traditional account of original sin 
and emphasized the inheritance of the effect of sin through physical descent. 
However, it did not insist upon monogenism and strikingly even presented 
a hypothetical example of how polygenism could be adopted as a legitimate 
alternative. The stated intention was “not to invite the faithful to give up 
the doctrine of monogenism, but to ease their minds in the midst of the 
various questions which their faith has to undergo today,” particularly 
due to the scientific consensus in favor of polygenism (Dhanis and Visser 
1969, 21). From the proposed polygenetic perspective, “Adam and Eve” 
would represent an “Adamite population.” Original sin took place within 
this population and the effects were spread through descent so that, after 
either one or perhaps several generations, there would no longer exist any 
innocent human couple capable of transmitting the state of original justice; 
all humans would then be in a state of sin. 
18 For some minor changes in wording for the English translation, see Ratzinger 1971, 750.
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Consequently, all the descendants of the “Adamite population” which would 
have been the equivalent of the “sinful Adam” have been burdened at birth with 
original sin. They would all have “sinned in Adam” (Dhanis and Visser 1969, 22).
Reliance upon the awkward phrase “sinned in Adam” may have been out 
of deference to Paul VI’s preference for this language. Since the sixteenth 
century, English translations of Romans 5:12 typically read “Therefore as sin 
came into the world through one man and death through sin, and so death 
spread to all men because all men sinned.” The fourth century Vulgate Latin 
translation of Saint Paul’s original Greek had been relied upon throughout 
the Middle Ages and used the phrase in quo omnes peccaverunt (in whom 
all have sinned) instead of the more accurate quatenus omnes peccaverunt 
(because all have sinned). The Vulgate version of Romans 5:12 was not 
questioned until Desiderius Erasmus published a new translation just prior 
to the Council of Trent (Coogan 1986). Although the Vulgate continued to be 
the preferred edition for the Western Church, Erasmus’ rendition of Romans 
5:12 with the phrase “because all have sinned” certainly prevailed. Numerous 
scholars, including Stanislaus Lyonnet, engaged in further philological 
discussion of the passage just prior to Vatican II. Although some variants 
of “because” were proposed, such as “insofar as,” the rejection of “in whom” 
was not in question. More controversially, the improved translation now 
was often incorporated into a theological argument that Saint Paul did 
not teach a doctrine of original sin that included an inheritance of Adam’s 
sin. For example, Lyonnet wrote that personal sin, while precipitated by 
Adam’s initial sin, was a contributing factor to the need for redemption, 
“a genuine causality but subordinated and not simply juxtaposed to that 
of the sin of Adam.”19
This train of thought did not align with Pope Paul VI’s assessment of 
the import of Trent. In his address to the 1966 original sin symposium, 
after noting that the eighth chapter of the schema De deposito fidei had not 
been included in Dei Verbum, “for reasons you know,” the pope claimed that 
other documents of the council fully confirmed the original sin doctrine 
19 Lyonnet 1955, 456; also see Lyonnet 1956, 73.
9(1)/2021110
J A M E S R. H O F M A N N
formulated by earlier councils. For example, he quoted from the only refer-
ence to “Adam” in Lumen Gentium: “Fallen in Adam (lapsos in Adamo), God 
the Father did not leave men to themselves, but ceaselessly offered helps 
to salvation” (Paul VI 1966, 77). Paul VI’s attachment to the wording “in 
Adam” continued in his “Credo” of June 30, 1968, a creed he issued in hopes 
of quieting doctrinal controversies during the post-Vatican II period.20 It 
was based upon a draft provided by Jacques Maritain that had included an 
insistence upon monogenism.21 This passage was dropped from the final 
version in which the relevant section on original sin read: “We believe 
that in Adam all have sinned (Credimus in Adam omnes peccavisse), which 
means that the original offense committed by him caused human nature, 
common to all men, to fall to a state in which it bears the consequences of 
that offense … We therefore hold, with the Council of Trent, that original 
sin is transmitted with human nature, ‘not by imitation, but by propagation’ 
and that it is thus ‘proper to everyone’” (Paul VI 1968). This insistence upon 
the transmission of original sin solely through propagation from Adam 
was shared by the CDF and may well have contributed to the decision to 
temporarily suspend Lyonnet from his teaching position.
Nevertheless, according to the authors of The Supplement, although 
the warning about polygenism in Humani generis and the “traditional 
formulas” promulgated by Paul VI certainly safeguard the faith, they do 
20 Paul VI’s “profession of faith” was issued in the motu proprio Solemni Hac Liturgia. Section 
16 stated: “We believe that in Adam all have sinned, which means that the original offense 
committed by him caused human nature, common to all men, to fall to a state in which 
it bears the consequences of that offense, and which is not the state in which it was at 
first in our first parents—established as they were in holiness and justice, and in which 
man knew neither evil nor death. It is human nature so fallen, stripped of the grace that 
clothed it, injured in its own natural powers and subjected to the dominion of death, that 
is transmitted to all men, and it is in this sense that every man is born in sin. We therefore 
hold, with the Council of Trent, that original sin is transmitted with human nature, ‘not 
by imitation, but by propagation’ and that it is thus ‘proper to everyone.’” (Pope Paul VI, 
1968)
21 See Cagin 2009. Maritain’s draft was conveyed to Paul VI by Charles Journet. It included 
the assertion that “all men and all races that today populate the earth descend from a first 
human couple that emerged from the peak of the animal world and … were the first beings 
to receive a spiritual and immortal soul” (Cagin 2009, 30).
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so “without closing the door to questions which are raised by scientific 
findings.” Furthermore, “the Church allows theologians to continue their 
investigations and to go on with their dialogue with the students of the 
natural sciences” (Dhanis and Visser 1969, 23). Inclusion of the wording 
“sinned in Adam” notwithstanding, the entire Supplement discussion was 
characterized by a remarkably receptive attitude toward polygenism as 
a viable possibility. The other aspects of original sin doctrine stated in the 
Commission’s Declaration and Paul VI’s creed clearly were considered more 
important to mandate than monogenism.
These CDF priorities were also evident during its investigation of 
a publication by the Swiss biblical theologian Herbert Haag. Haag had 
been called to the Catholic Faculty at the University of Tübingen in 1960, 
the same year as Hans Küng, who became his colleague and close friend. 
An internationally renowned scholar and Professor of the Old Testament, 
Haag published a 1966 monograph in which he argued that the doctrine 
of an original sin inherited by all mankind from Adam is not taught either 
in the Old Testament or by Saint Paul (Haag 1966). The book quickly went 
through four German editions and an American translation (Haag, 1969). 
Haag apparently was delated to the CDF shortly after the initial publication; 
in February of 1968 he was informed by Undersecretary Charles Moeller that 
the CDF had reservations about several propositions concerning original sin 
that allegedly were advanced in his book. These assertions were conveyed 
to Haag in Latin translation and he was asked to explain how they were in 
conformity to Catholic doctrine. Haag initially complained that the propo-
sitions had been taken out of context and inaccurately expressed in Latin; 
when he did not comment more specifically, a slightly revised second set 
of propositions was sent to him in April of 1971. Following some additional 
correspondence, Haag finally responded in detail the following August. 
After providing what he considered to be more accurate Latin expressions 
of his published statements, he argued at length that his views were indeed 
a legitimate reading of scripture and its bearing upon tradition.22 By this 
22 In 1973 Haag published some of his 1968–1972 correspondence with Franjo Šeper who 
served as the CDF Prefect between 1968 and 1981 (Haag 1973b). 
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point Haag felt his book was slightly out of date and he had also written 
a series of trenchant review articles critiquing many recent discussions of 
original sin as too timidly adhering to traditional formulas.23
It is noteworthy that none of the propositions ascribed to Haag and 
brought into question by the CDF made any mention of polygenism. Instead, 
the Congregation asked for resolution of other methodological and substan-
tive issues. For example, did Haag propose that in modern explanations of 
original sin theologians should explicate dogma in the light of scripture 
rather than explicate scripture in the light of dogma? Did he assert that 
the concept of hereditary sin was not found in either the Old Testament 
or in the thought of Saint Paul? Haag certainly had expressed himself on 
these issues. For example, he had written that “The concept of sin or death 
as inherited is not mentioned at all by Paul” (Haag 1969, 97), and “For the 
same reason, it is impossible to agree in finding here a teaching of ‘inherited 
death’” (Haag 1969, 121). Similarly, he wrote that “In reality, the idea of the 
passive participation of all Adam’s descendants in the sin of Adam is far 
from Paul’s mind, and it is not permissible to read this idea into verse 12 
by understanding ‘because all have sinned’ in the sense of ‘because all (in 
Adam) have become sinful’” (Haag 1969, 99). “No man enters this world 
a sinner” (Haag 1969, 107).
The CDF judged Haag’s responses defending his position on these points 
to be unsatisfactory and he was told to abjure the assertions at stake and 
desist from advancing them in any manner. Haag ignored this order and 
the affair was never resolved.24 Although the Congregation did not include 
monogenism in its inquiries, Haag had in fact been quite explicit in arguing 
that it is not supported by scripture and should not be considered a theolog-
ical issue. “Whether mankind originated in monogenism or polygenism is 
a question which only science can answer; it is not a theological question. 
23 See, for example, Haag 1970.
24 Hans Küng mentioned that in 1977 a last attempt by Bishop Georg Moser to get a re-
sponse from Haag was unsuccessful (Küng 2008, 273). From Haag’s perspective, “The pro-
ceedings – while saving face for the Romans - went in my favor and I can attest that since 
then in theological textbooks and catechisms ‘original sin’ has been treated differently 
than previously” (Haag 1991, 76–77).
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The thesis of polygenism cannot be rejected on the basis of original sin” 
(Haag 1969, 107). Furthermore, in his correspondence with the CDF, Haag 
noted that recent developments in theological discussion of original sin did 
not rely upon monogenism. “A not unimportant role is played therein by the 
scientifically supported fact that a monogenetic origin of humanity appears 
to be excluded. Even Karl Rahner, counter to his earlier assertions, has 
expressly recognized the compatibility of “Erbsündenlehre” with polygen-
ism … . As a matter of fact, however, with the abandonment of monogenism 
the diffusion of an original sin by means of descent is fundamentally ruled 
out” (Haag 1973b, 188).
So, while Haag pointedly rejected both monogenism and the inheritance 
of the effects of sin, the CDF did not object to his acceptance of polygenism. 
Haag was undeterred by the investigation and continued to write predom-
inately negative commentary on original sin publications. He labelled the 
efforts in The Supplement to hypothetically combine inheritance of sin 
with polygenism “absurd” (Haag 1973a, 263), and added that “one is also 
tempted to ask if it would not have been more consistent to drop the term 
‘original sin’ and thus to eliminate all the problems consequent on the use 
of the term” (Haag 1973a, 269). By this point the CDF was also investigating 
Haag’s 1969 book, Abschied vom Teufel (Farewell to the Devil), and the 1970 
Infallible? An Inquiry by his Tübingen colleague Hans Küng. Haag was not 
intimidated and proclaimed that “a farewell to original sin will not come 
too soon. The doctrine of original sin is a test case, serving to focus more 
sharply the question of whether traditional Church teaching is binding and 
infallible—a question which dogmatic theologians have long oversimplified” 
(Haag 1973a, 288). 
Although Küng did not cite the doctrine of monogenism in his polemic 
against infallibility, Francis Sullivan has argued that it can serve as a relevant 
case study. Vatican I had of course been the occasion for the proclamation of 
papal infallibility, but it also brought new attention to the potential power 
of the ordinary universal magisterium, a topic that resurfaced at Vatican II 
and was asserted in Lumen Gentium.
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Although the individual bishops do not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, 
they nevertheless proclaim Christ’s doctrine infallibly whenever, even though 
dispersed through the world, but still maintaining the bond of communion 
among themselves and with the successor of Peter, and authentically teaching 
matters of faith and morals, they are in agreement on one position as definitively 
to be held (Paul VI 1964).
Necessary and sufficient conditions for invoking the infallibility of 
magisterial teaching have been difficult to establish and Sullivan uses 
monogenism as an example of how the criterion of universality is not 
satisfactory. At Vatican I, draft documents included proposals to define 
monogenism as a dogma of faith; they encountered no opposition from 
the Council Fathers prior to the premature interruption of the council by 
political developments. One century later, the lack of consensus offered 
a stark contrast. 
Here we have an instance of a consensus that seemed strong enough in 1870 
to justify defining a doctrine as a dogma of faith, but which has not remained 
constant and is no longer universal. It would hardly seem reasonable to argue 
that since the former consensus had fulfilled the conditions required for the 
infallible exercise of ordinary universal magisterium, the subsequent lack of 
consensus could not nullify the claim that the doctrine had already been infallibly 
taught (Sullivan 1996, 349).
Mindful of the gradual acceptance of polygenism during the century 
after 1870 and its relevance to arguments against infallibility, Haag took 
broader exception to the entire doctrine of original sin. In contrast to his 
sharp critiques of many authors, he was more sympathetic to the position 
taken by Charles Baumgartner. Due to the posthumous publications of 
Teilhard’s essays on original sin, Baumgartner could quote approvingly 
from the explanatory note Teilhard had written just after Humani generis. 
Although he granted that the best argument for monogenism was an indirect 
one showing that it seemed to be presupposed by the Tridentine doctrine 
of original sin, Baumgartner denied that monogenism truly is a necessary 
prerequisite; “what is certain is that the dogma of original sin, as well as that 
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of redemption, necessarily postulate the unity of the human race, a unity 
which is also a direct teaching of scripture itself” (Baumgartner 1969, 129). 
While earlier theologians could only conceptualize this unity by invoking 
monogenism, modern science strongly encourages other possibilities. As 
long as the central idea of an initial free human choice of sin is preserved, 
detailed depiction of attenuating circumstances, including the choice 
between monogenism and polygenism, “no longer directly concern the 
substance of the faith.” If this is the case, then, along with the motion of 
the earth and its age, “monogenism and polygenism would be problems 
relevant to the domain of the natural sciences and exclusively within their 
competence” (Baumgartner 1969, 130). Baumgartner argued for a decisive 
disengagement from presuppositions such as monogenism that in the past 
were considered essential but now have become impediments to acceptance 
of the essential Catholic doctrine of original sin, namely, “the theological 
condition of humanity bereft of Christ” (Baumgartner 1969, 165).
Subsequent developments in original sin theology have to a large extent 
accomplished the disengagement Baumgartner recommended. Arguments 
over monogenism and polygenism have become less and less important 
in most of these discussions (McDermott 1977). In 1971 Edward Yarnold 
followed Schoonenberg’s lead in asserting that “One need not even argue 
that monogenism is false: it is simply irrelevant. We are all members of the 
same guilty race whether we have all descended from a single ancestor or 
not” (Yarnold 1971, 78). By 1981 Karl Rahner could comment that, just as 
it is common knowledge that Catholic doctrine now holds no objection to 
the antiquity of humanity, “To all appearances the teaching office has also 
abandoned its opposition to polygenism despite Paul VI’s original intention 
to adhere to monogenism” (Rahner 1988, 41). Pope John Paul II made no 
mention of polygenism in a 1996 discourse in which he famously asserted 
that, in reference to Humani generis, “Today, almost half a century after the 
publication of the encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of 
the theory of evolution as more than a hypothesis” (John Paul II, 1996). 
Later in John Paul II’s papacy, under the supervision of Cardinal Joseph 
Ratzinger, the future Pope Benedict XVI, the International Theological 
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Commission issued a lengthy document on the creation of humanity in the 
image of God and made only a passing and noncommittal reference to the 
distinction between monogenism and polygenism. “Catholic theology affirms 
that the emergence of the first members of the human species (whether as 
individuals or in populations) represents an event that is not susceptible 
of a purely natural explanation and which can appropriately be attributed 
to divine intervention (International Theological Commission 2004, ⁋ 70).
It would appear that the Catholic magisterium has gradually arrived at 
approximately the same attitude toward polygenism that it maintained for 
so long toward the motion of the earth: nonassertive official disapproval 
combined with de facto acceptance. Nevertheless, as the historical record 
demonstrates, there is far more conceptual complexity to the monogenism 
issue than was the case for geostasis. In particular, in addition to its irrele-
vance for some schools of original sin theology, monogenism can be given 
a spiritual characterization in which it is immune to the scientific mode 
of refutation that made geostasis untenable. This capacity for a synthesis 
with biological polygenism means that there is reason to expect some form 
of theological monogenism to persist.
Conclusion
In 1992, 360 years after the trial of Galileo, Pope John Paul II brought some 
closure to the affair by agreeing with his investigative Pontifical Academy 
committee that exegetical and theological mistakes had been made. The 
initial arguments that the earth is in motion had been put forward just 
when the Reformation made Catholic ecclesiastical authority over biblical 
exegesis a point of contention.25 Under those confrontational circumstances, 
25 In 1546, just three years after Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus, the Fourth Session of the 
Council of Trent decreed that “no one, relying on his own skill, shall,–in matters of faith, 
and of morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine, –wresting the sacred 
Scripture to his own senses, presume to interpret the said sacred Scripture contrary to that 
sense which holy mother Church,–whose it is to judge of the true sense and interpretation 
of the holy Scriptures,–hath held and doth hold; or even contrary to the unanimous con-
sent of the Fathers.” https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/trent/fourth-session.htm
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the Vatican Curia decided that the Copernican planetary model contradicted 
scripture and must be prohibited; noncompliant Galileo was found guilty 
of a vehement suspicion of heresy and Riccioli’s geostatic model received 
longstanding preference (Hofmann 2020b, 99–102). Although the Catholic 
magisterium gradually recognized the legitimacy of heliocentric models 
that included the motion of the earth, stubborn theological allegiance to 
geostasis persisted in many instances. When Robert de Sinéty defended 
Erich Wasmann’s acceptance of the evolution of systematic species, he 
compared reactionary theological concerns about Wasmann to those that had 
continued for so long over Copernicus and Galileo. He noted an example of 
theological preference for a geostatic model as late as 1764 (De Sinéty 1906, 
238–239). William Wallace has cited other examples of not only geostasis 
but geocentrism in Catholic scholastic teaching manuals as late as 1783 
(Wallace 1968, 74). To be sure, the 1741 publication of Galileo’s collected 
works received an imprimatur, the 1758 edition of the Index of Prohibited 
Books ended previous prohibition of “all books teaching the earth’s motion 
and the sun’s immobility,” and in 1835 books by Copernicus, Galileo and 
Kepler were finally dropped from the Index. However, in the absence of any 
summary and decisive Vatican directive, there were extensive objections and 
convoluted negotiations over every stage in this intermittent and piecemeal 
process (Finocchiaro 2005, 126–240). 
How comparable is the Catholic Church’s lengthy commitment to mono-
genism? The nuanced triangulation of revelation, scripture, and tradition 
clearly has been at the heart of prolonged resistance to both the motion of 
the earth and polygenism. However, the central error of the Galileo case, the 
flawed reasoning that a scientific assertion was contrary to scripture, was 
not repeated when theologians questioned the necessity of monogenism. 
Instead, attention focused almost exclusively on doctrinal tradition as the 
potential source of conflict; debate over polygenism unfolded in conjunction 
with more fundamental disputes over the authority of tradition and its 
relation to scripture and revelation.
The nexus of scripture and tradition obviously was a central concern 
when documents responding to sola scriptura were composed at the Council 
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of Trent. When the Council Fathers incorporated references to the Genesis 
narrative into what became the Tridentine teaching on original sin, they 
created an influential doctrinal formulation using wording that gave a strong 
impression that monogenism was a prominent component of Catholic 
tradition. During the second half of the nineteenth century, two theological 
issues related to human origins directed new attention to this teaching. On 
the one hand, the Genesis narrative gave a biblical grounding to Catholic 
support for the unity of mankind thesis, a position that stood in opposition 
to human polyphyletism, the hypothesis of multiple independent human 
racial lineages that was often misleadingly referred to as polygenism. Among 
many others, Clarence Augustus Walworth, Jean Guibert, Robert de Sinéty, 
Henry de Dorlodot, Henri Breuil, as well as Jean and Amédée Bouyssonie, 
all contributed refutations of polyphyletism, a collective effort that con-
tinued well into the twentieth century. By the 1960s, in spite of a belated 
retrograde effort by Carleton Stevens Coon, human polyphyletism in the 
crude racial form proposed by Hermann Klaatsch could be curtly dismissed 
as scientifically unviable.26 
On the other hand, evolutionary research into monophyletic human 
origins prompted a wide variety of reactions from Catholic theologians 
who were allowed some latitude with respect to the evolution of the human 
body but were also expected to safeguard the unique spiritual character of 
ensouled humanity. It was in this context that concern arose over the much 
more scientifically plausible form of polygenism, the descent of humans 
from a single population but not from a single couple. When the 1909 Bib-
lical Commission decree on Genesis 1–3 called for acknowledgment of the 
historical import of the Genesis narrative of Adam and Eve, insistence upon 
monogenism was included in anti-modernist reaction against “development 
of doctrine” theology. This pressure intensified when proponents of the 
nouvelle théologie reopened debate over the historically conditioned nature 
of doctrinal formulations. The result was that throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century monogenism was tenaciously upheld by a multitude 
26 See Smulders 1967 and Ayala 1967. For Coon, see Jackson and Depew 2017, 172–206.
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of influential voices that included Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet, Francis Ceup-
pens, Émile Amann, Maurice Flick, Joseph Bataini, and especially Réginald 
Garrigou-Lagrange. Bolstered by institutional support that provided ready 
access to prominent publication opportunities, these adamant apologists 
thoroughly eclipsed the cautious doubts tentatively raised by the Bouyssonie 
brothers and Henri Rondet. Teilhard’s unpublished but clandestinely circu-
lated rejection of monogenism became one of Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s 
primary examples of what he considered to be a dangerous tendency to 
deny the immutability of dogma, a conviction that contributed to Pius XII’s 
decision to prohibit polygenism in Humani generis. Widespread supportive 
response to the encyclical included unsympathetic assessments of polygen-
ism in publications by Anthony Cotter, Charles Boyer, Augustin Bea, Guy 
Picard, Léon Renwart, Marie-Michel Labourdette, Karl Rahner, Johannes 
Feiner, Cyril Vollert, and Jean de Fraine. A less insistent set of commentators, 
including Ernest Messenger, Georges Vandebroek, Dominique Dubarle, Pieter 
Smulders, and Robert North, did express reservations about monogenism 
based upon scientific evidence but they deferred to ecclesiastical authority 
pending further theological development, progress that was difficult to 
achieve under the threat of Vatican censorship.
During the years immediately prior to the convocation of Vatican II, 
historical research by Josef Geiselmann and Stanislaus Lyonnet contributed 
to renewed debate over how the truths of the gospel have been preserved in 
scripture and tradition, the crucial issue for the acceptability of polygenism. 
The 1965 proclamation Dei Verbum that excluded a proposed prohibition 
of polygenism was an important turning point and a defeat for the conser-
vative position represented by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani and Paul VI. At 
this point Zoltán Alszeghy and Maurice Flick published their polygenetic 
analysis of original sin and Karl Rahner announced that he no longer saw 
any convincing theological barrier to polygenism. Shortly thereafter The 
Supplement to A New Catechism sent a clear signal that theologically judi-
cious use of polygenism was not objectionable to the highest levels of the 
Roman Curia. Acceptable examples would include reliance upon an Adamite 
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population that either engaged in a collective sin or collectively suffered 
the immediate consequences of an individual sin. 
Of course by this point numerous Catholic theologians were no longer 
interested in explicitly synthesizing the scientific idea of polygenism with 
the theology of original sin. Situationalists such as Piet Schoonenberg, 
André-Marie Dubarle and Edward Yarnold found the choice between mono-
genism and polygenism theologically inconsequential and irrelevant to 
their understanding of original sin as the “sin of the world.” By assigning 
the Genesis narrative a primarily historical significance as a familiar but 
nonessential representation of doctrine, they relegated analysis of ancestral 
human population structure to the scientific domain.
A more conventional approach that retains a role for Adam and Eve is 
to recognize that acceptance of biological polygenism does not rule out 
theological monogenism based upon a spiritual demarcation. As explored 
by Camille Muller, and René Lavocat, as well as in the early work of Giovanni 
Blandino, for example, monogenism in this guise does not conflict with the 
polygenetic scientific analysis of species change via population genetics. 
If Adam and Eve differed from their biologically human contemporaries in 
a purely spiritual manner, there are no prohibitive scientific implications. 
Francisco Ayala’s argument, that the high degree of genetic diversity 
in modern humans rules out an ancestral population of a single human 
couple, would only be pertinent under the assumption that theological 
monogenism requires the initial existence of just two biological humans, 
presumably Homo sapiens (Ayala et al 1994). Both Kenneth Kemp and 
Joshua Swamidass have recently pointed out that arguments in this vein 
do not apply if a spiritual condition distinguishes the first two humans 
from a larger population of their contemporaries (Kemp 2011; Swamidass 
2019). Furthermore, additional distinctions between human ensoulment 
and subsequent spiritual and psychological development to the point of 
moral discernment have been invoked by Blandino, Lavocat, Alszeghy, and 
Flick, among others. In general, those who reconceptualize monogenism 
in an exclusively spiritual sense can choose to designate Adam and Eve as 
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the first ensouled or sanctified humans while also accepting the biological 
polygenism of a larger population.
It would be premature to expect that progress within any of these 
frameworks will prompt a new pronouncement on polygenism from the 
Vatican. In 1992, the same year as John Paul II’s resolution of the Galileo 
affair, discussions of original sin in new publications of the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church included multiple references to Adam and Eve.
How did the sin of Adam become the sin of all his descendants? The whole 
human race is in Adam “as one body of one man”. By this “unity of the human 
race” all men are implicated in Adam’s sin, as all are implicated in Christ’s 
justice. Still, the transmission of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully 
understand. But we do know by Revelation that Adam had received original 
holiness and justice not for himself alone, but for all human nature. By yielding 
to the tempter, Adam and Eve committed a personal sin, but this sin affected 
the human nature that they would then transmit in a fallen state (Catechism of 
the Catholic Church, n. 404).
Among theologians, this reliance upon the biblical narrative does not have 
the implications that it had a century ago. As Stephen Duffy confidently 
remarked in 1988:
Obviously Christology eliminates the need for the supplementary hypothesis 
of monogenism to ground the assertion of sin’s radical and universal sway. 
Biological descent of the race from Adam as its historical progenitor yields to 
the unity of human finality revealed in the second Adam and is reflected in the 
saga of the first Adam only as its antitype (Duffy 1988, 618–619). 
In conclusion, when a contrast is drawn between geostasis and mono-
genism, the historical record supports two fairly straightforward gener-
alizations. First, theological commitment to monogenism has been more 
deeply rooted in historically conditioned doctrines of Catholic tradition 
than was the case for geostasis. Secondly, monogenism has been much 
more amenable to nuanced conceptual development than geostasis was. In 
particular, monogenism can be given a purely spiritual characterization; 
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it is difficult to imagine an analogous role for “theological geostasis.” The 
combination of these two historical factors provides some explanation 
for the persistence of monogenism. As Teilhard perceptively observed in 
1950, “monogenism and polygenism are in reality purely theological notions, 
introduced for dogmatic reasons” (Teilhard de Chardin 1971, 209). To the 
extent that dogmatic reasons traditionally associated with original sin 
continue to be perceived as both compelling and authoritative, it can be 
expected that theological monogenism in some form will persist as well.
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